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Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich
Korolev, 1946
Korolev, 1946
Credit: © Mark Wade
Soviet Chief Designer, responsible for creating the first long range ballistic missiles, the first space launchers, the first artificial satellite, and putting the first man in space. After his premature death the Soviets lagged in space.

Born: 1907-01-12. Died: 1966-01-14. Birth Place: Zhitomir.

Korolev created the first Soviet rockets and spacecraft. He was portrayed for years as a legendary, iconographic figure that single-handedly was responsible for the early Soviet victories in the space race. He was singularly responsible for creating the first long range ballistic missiles, the first space launchers, the first artificial satellite, and putting the first man in space. His premature death led to his name and accomplishments being made public, while those of other chief designers of rockets and satellites remained secret. This resulted in an exaggerated perception that he occupied a uniquely central position in rocketry and spaceflight. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the lives and roles of other important figures in Soviet became known in great detail. In the process a more balanced view of Korolev became possible.

Korolev's story was inextricably bound up in the deep passions and resentments of the three titans of Soviet space rocketry - Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, Vladimir Nikolayev Chelomei, and Valentin Petrovich Glushko. Each had his own patrons in the Kremlin hierarchy and Politburo. Each had been deeply scarred and mishandled by the Soviet system. Each was very sure that his technical and management approach was superior. The depth of their passions in their struggle for ascendancy can scarcely be imagined.

Korolev was born to a Russian literature teacher in the town of Zhitomir in the Ukraine. He was fascinated with aircraft at an early age and became a pilot. At the age of 17 he had designed his first glider, the K-5. After attending the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, he went on to the Moscow Higher Technical University (MVTU). There he was involved in design and construction of an increasingly ambitious series of gliders, culminating in the SK-4, designed for record duration flights in the stratosphere. He became interested in the possibilities of rocket-propelled aircraft and in September 1931, together with Tsander, founded the Moscow rocketry organization GIRD (Group for Investigation of Reactive Motion).

Similar efforts were underway abroad. In America the secretive Robert Goddard had already flown his first liquid propellant rockets. In Germany the VfR (Verein fuer Raumschiffahrt - Society for Spaceship Travel) was testing liquid fuelled rockets of increasing size. The VfR collapsed in 1933 as its members chose to leave the country or begin work for the Nazi government. The members that remained finally developed the A-4 (V-2) missile, the basis for all liquid fuel rockets to follow. In America the potential of his Goddard's work was unrecognized. He finally had to close up his New Mexico test range and develop small auxiliary rockets for the Navy.

In Russia, GIRD was launching the Soviet Union's first liquid-propelled rockets, the GIRD-9 and GIRD-10. GIRD lasted only two years before the military, seeing the potential of rockets, replaced it with the RNII (Reaction Propulsion Scientific Research Institute). Glushko was brought from Leningrad to head rocket engine design at RNII, while Korolev was in charge of airframes. They developed a series of rocket-propelled missiles and gliders during the 1930's, culminating in Korolev's RP-318, Russia's first rocket propelled manned aircraft, powered by Glushko's ORM-65 rocket engine.

Before the aircraft could make a rocket propelled flight, Korolev and Glushko were thrown into the Soviet prison system in 1938 during the peak of Stalin's insane purges. Glushko was arrested on March 23. Korolev, denounced by Glushko, was arrested on June 7 and sentenced to ten years hard labor on 27 September. He spent On 10 July 1940 he was sentenced to work in the Kolyma gold mines, a virtual death sentence to the most dreaded part of the Gulag. However Stalin had recognized the importance of aeronautical engineers in preparing for the impending war with Hitler. A system of sharashkas (prison design bureaus) was set up to exploit jailed talent. Korolev was saved by the intervention of senior aircraft designer Sergei Tupolev, himself a prisoner, who requested his services in the TsKB-39 sharashka. In September 1940, his health already ruined, he was transferred to work at Tupolev's bureau in Moscow. Korolev was not allowed to work on rockets except at night on his own time. His RP-318 had flown on 28 February 1940, without his involvement.

In 1942, after Tupolev's team was evacuated to Omsk, Korolev was transferred to TsKB-16 in Kazan where he served as Deputy Director for Flight Testing (although still officially a prisoner). Here he was able to return to development of rockets for aircraft and missile propulsion. In November 1944 Korolev was given charge of a team of 60 engineers and required to provide a draft project for a Soviet counterpart to the V-2 within three days. The resulting two-stage design used Lox/Alcohol propellants and an autopilot for guidance. These designs evolved into the more refined D-1 and D-2 rockets with a 75 km range.

With the war over, the immense progress that the Von Braun team had made in rocketry became apparent. Provided nearly unlimited funds, the Germans had developed the 300 km range V-2 missile, which was a decade ahead of the Soviet designs. The Russian engineers that first inspected the recovered remains of a V-2 called it ‘that which cannot be'.

Stalin, fascinated with the technology, was quite annoyed that the Peenemuende team had gone over to the Americans and that American intelligence had managed to loot most of the V-2 factories and rockets, even in the Russian zone. Russian teams were sent seize available equipment and information as early as April 1945. Korolev was released from the Kazan sharashka and was in Germany from August 1945. At first he merely accompanying the team that salvaged what was left. He was present (under guard, outside the fence, while Glushko was part of the official delegation inside) at the British 'Operation Backfire' launch of a V-2 from Altenwaide on 15 October 1945. He interviewed dozens of V-2 engineers and technicians still in Germany.

On May 13, 1946 Stalin signed the decree beginning development of Soviet ballistic missiles. The Minister of Armaments, Dmitri Fedorovich Ustinov, was put in charge. In August 1946, the Scientific Research Institute NII-88 was established to copy the V-2 missile. Although not fully rehabilitated, Korolev's piercing personality and organizational abilities had clearly been impressive, and Ustinov personally appointed him Chief Constructor NII-88. Glushko was named head of GDL-OKB to design engines for Korolev's rockets. Following Korolev's selection, 234 German employees of the Mittelwerke V-2 factory were rounded up on the night of 22-23 October 1946 and sent to relatively good living conditions at Gordodomlya on Lake Seleger, between Moscow and Leningrad. Thus the jailed became the jailer. However until he had proved himself a master of rocket technology, Korolev would be forced to have his rocket designs considered in competition with those of Groettrup's German team.

The first task was to put the V-2 into production in Russia. This was a huge undertaking -- Russian manufacturing technology was equivalent to that of Germany at the beginning of the 1930's. Before this was even underway, a competition was held for design of an improved V-2. This R-2 was designed by Korolev in 1947-1948 in competition with Groettrup's G-1. When the State Commission evaluated the designs in December 1948, the G-1 was found the superior design. Korolev fought the decision for a long time, updating his R-2 design to include some of the G-1's features. Finally the decision was reversed and Korolev's design was accepted for test. State trials flights were conducted from 21 September 1949 to July 1951.

The next competition was for a quantum leap to a 3000 km range ballistic missile. The NTS (Scientific-Technical Soviet) of NII-88 met in plenary session on 7 December 1949 and subjected Korolev's R-3 design to withering criticism. In general they preferred Groettrup's G-4/R-14 design to the same requirement. This assumed fewer technical advances in engine design but greater improvements in mass fraction reduction. After heated discussion, the Soviet approved further development of technology for the R-3, but not the missile itself.

With this decision Korolev finally caved in and adopted the German aerodynamic and engine solutions with fervor in his next designs. He put the R-3 on a slow track to oblivion. Following years of trade studies, approval came for development of an intercontinental rocket with a range of 7,000 km on 13 February 1953. Korolev used a modification of the German concept for an ICBM. What started out as Groettrup's 'cluster of G-4's' (G-5 / R-15) became the R-7 when Korolev conceived of a lengthened core sustainer stage. This would allow all engines to be ignited on the pad, eliminating the problems of air start in Groettrup's design.

The German team was aware of none of this. Members of the team began to be repatriated on 3 April 1951. By October 1951 they were completely isolated and work basically stopped. The last member of the group returned to Germany on 22 November 1953. Groettrup made it to West Germany and was debriefed by the CIA in 1957, but provided some deliberately false information and downplayed the importance of the German work in order to avoid Russian retribution. The full story did not come out until the end of the century.

In order to concentrate on development of the R-7, further IRBM development was spun off to a new design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk headed by Korolev's assistant, Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel. This was the first of several design bureaus that would be spun off from Korolev's OKB-1 bureau once a new technology had been perfected.

The R-7 faced enormous development problems. Glushko's RD-105/RD-106 rocket motors had seemingly insoluble combustion chamber instability problems. The weight of the thermonuclear warhead to be carried was increased from the 3 metric tons to 5.5 metric tons. The entire vehicle had to be scaled up proportionately, and this meant that Glushko's troublesome single-chamber engines had to be replaced by the RD-107/-108 design, a cluster of four nozzles sharing common fuel pumps. This could assure stable combustion, but greatly increased the complexity of the booster, with a total of twenty main engines and sixteen vernier engines firing at lift-off, as opposed to five engines for the RD-105/106 approach. Korolev already had reason to be dissatisfied with Glushko's performance.

Korolev's enormous drive and personal attention to detail overcame all obstacles. The R-7 was first successfully launched on 21 August 1957 and then orbited the first artificial earth satellite on 4 October 1957. The first operational satellite for the launcher was to have been the Zenit military photoreconnaissance satellite. Korolev, flushed after the success of Sputnik, instead advocated that manned spaceflight should have first priority. After bitter disputes, a compromise solution was reached. Korolev was authorized to proceed with development of a spacecraft to achieve manned flights at the earliest possible date. However the design would be such that the same spacecraft could be used to fulfill the military's unmanned photoreconnaissance satellite requirement. In November 1958 the Council of Chief designers approved the Vostok manned space program, in combination with the Zenit spy satellite program. The Vostok would put the first human being into space on 12 April 1961.

The next quantum leap was a launcher designed expressly for Soviet conquest of the planets. When the time came for the 75 metric ton payload N1 rocket in the late 1950's, Korolev again turned to German work. The N1 was the direct aerodynamic descendent of the Groettrup G-2 and G-4. It incorporated all of the essential features of Groettrup's designs - the 85-degree slope cone, topped by a cylindrical fore body and a sharply spiked nose, and the use of upper stages of the conical vehicle as smaller launch vehicles (the N11 and N111 in the case of the N1). It was only the limitations of Soviet manufacturing technology that forced Korolev to adopt the spherical tank design of the N1 in place of the integral common-bulkhead tanks of the Groettrup vehicles.

As development and production of rockets and spacecraft became an increasing part of the Soviet industry, other chief designers set their sights on getting a piece of the pie. Chelomei was the country's leading designer of cruise missiles. It was apparent that the ballistic missile, for which no defense could be developed for decades, would win out over the cruise missile as a weapon system. Chelomei was also anxious to be involved in the much more exciting area of space flight. When Korolev's R-7 experienced a long string of launch failures in the summer of 1957, Chelomei was quick to criticize Korolev and ask to be put in charge of the development. But the decisive event in getting a piece of the space action was Chelomei's hiring of Nikita Khrushchev's son, Sergei. This gave Chelomei sudden and immediate access to the highest possible patron in the hierarchy. He was rewarded with his own design bureau, OKB-52, in 1959. OKB-52 was immediately assigned several development projects in the explosion of military space and missile projects following the U-2 shoot down, the resulting collapse of the Geneva talks with Eisenhower, and Kennedy's accession to the presidency in the United States.

Kennedy had been partly elected on the basis of claims of a 'missile gap' with the Soviet Union. Russia's succession of Sputnik and Luna launches, combined with the bellicose claims of Khrushchev, created the public impression that Russia was far ahead of the United States in the fielding of unstoppable ICBM's and space weapons. In fact, Korolev's R-7, with its enormous launch pads, complex assembly and launching procedures, cryogenic liquid oxygen oxidizer, and radio-controlled guidance was a totally impractical weapon. The warhead ended up being overweight, giving it a range of only 6,800 km, barely enough to reach the northern United States. As a result, it would be deployed as a weapon at only eight launch pads at Tyuratam and Plesetsk, in the north of the country. More practical successors, Yangel's R-16 and Korolev's R-9, would not be available for years. The Eisenhower administration, thanks to the U-2 overflights, knew that the 'missile gap' did not exist, but in that curious logic that pertains to intelligence matters, would not tell the US public that it knew that the Soviet missile threat was virtually non-existent.

Nevertheless, having been elected on the basis of the existence of such a threat, and having selected the former general manager of General Motors, Robert McNamara, as his Secretary of Defence, Kennedy felt impelled to plunge into a massive program of ICBM construction. Evidently unable to think in terms of smaller numbers due to his motor industry background , McNamara chose the nice round figure of 1,000 ICBM's as a goal. The existing Atlas and Titan designs were too expensive to operate in such large numbers. Therefore the Minuteman program, already begun under Eisenhower, was expanded to provide a low-maintenance solid-fuelled missile that could be produced and cheaply operated in vast quantities.

The Russians, shocked into being drawn into an expensive arms race involving a thousand missiles as opposed to a few hundred, began development of equivalents. Korolev was tasked to build a solid-fuelled counterpart of the Minuteman, the RT-2. This new technology weapon encountered technical problems and was never fielded in any significant numbers. Khrushchev asked Chelomei to build a less risky, small liquid fuelled missile, the UR-100. This became the Soviet equivalent to the Minuteman, being built in the thousands and making Chelomei the leading rocket manufacturer in Russia. Yangel was to continue development of his R-16 into the R-36 'city-buster' missiles, which the Pentagon held up as an enormous threat during the three decades to come (although they never felt impelled to duplicate it by simply deploying more of the equivalent Titan 2).

Chelomei's ascendancy coincided with a huge technical dispute between Korolev on the one hand and Glushko on the other. Glushko had decided to quit developing rocket engines using cryogenic liquid oxygen. The use of hypergolic (self-igniting), storable oxidizer and fuel combinations had enormous operational advantages. The propellants could be put in the missile's tanks and stored for long periods. Such rockets, once fuelled, were available at any time for launch. Rockets using cryogenic liquids had to be loaded just before the launch, since the liquid oxygen quickly boiled off at normal temperatures. If a launch was delayed for more than a couple of hours, launchers using cryogenic liquids had to be defueled, and refueled again for the next attempt, leading typically to a one day recycle time before the next launch could be attempted. The drawback of the storable propellants was that they were typically very toxic and dangerously corrosive. They had to be handled very carefully in special chemical protection gear. In the case of spills, accidents, or booster explosions, a dangerous cloud of toxic gas was created and the surrounding area contaminated.

Glushko (and Chelomei, Yangel, and Makeyev) felt that the operational advantages of storable propellants outweighed the safety issues. Korolev did not, and insisted in using liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants even in missile applications. The rift was complete during development of Korolev's R-9 ICBM. Glushko only provided engines to Korolev's specifications under direct orders from the Soviet leadership. Korolev turned to Nikolai Kuznetsov's bureau, whose previous experience had been in turboprop engines, to develop engines for the later R-9 versions and the new N1 space launcher. The Soviet military sided with Glushko - it only deployed 54 of Korolev's R-9 missiles, as against 380 of Yangel's R-16 and 800 of Chelomei's UR-100 (and it should be noted, the Americans selected toxic storable propellants for their Titan 2 rocket, the French for the Ariane, and the Chinese for the Long March).

None of this gained Korolev any friends in the military. They had contributed huge sums to his R-5, R-7 and R-9 programs and he had not produced any weapons of military usefulness. Their Zenit military reconnaissance satellite, begun in 1956, was deferred after Korolev's intervention, in favor of the Vostok manned spaceflight program. He was using missiles developed with their money for the purpose of exploring outer space. While it certainly provided positive propaganda for the Communist system, it was not contributing to the security of the Soviet state.

Each chief designer therefore became identified with powerful patrons in the cliques of the Kremlin hierarchy. Korolev, and his deputy Mishin, had in their employ Yuri Semenov, the son-in-law of Politburo ideology chief Andrei Kirilenko. Glushko and Yangel, by virtue of their production of the missiles that the military actually wanted, earned the patronage of Dmitri Ustinov. Chelomei had his direct conduit to Khrushchev.

In his pursuit of his dream of manned conquest of space, Korolev divested himself of all peripheral activities. He had already passed tactical and sea-launched missiles to Makeyev, storable propellant long range missiles to Yangel, and communications and navigations satellites to Reshetnev. Korolev finally obtained approval for a Soviet manned lunar lading program in August 1964. In order to concentrate on achieving a moon landing, the remaining ‘peripheral' work of OKB-1 were spun off to others: solid propellant rockets to Nadiradze; military satellites to Kozlov in Samara; lunar and planetary probes to Babakin at Lavochkin. The overthrow of Khrushchev two months later put Chelomei out of favor and allowed Korolev to gather into his hands all manned space projects.

Korolev, despite a lack of enthusiasm in the Soviet hierarchy and a budget a fraction of the Americans, continued to engineer space triumphs. In 1964 and 1965 modifications of the Vostok were used to orbit the first multi-crew spacecraft and for the first space walk. But it was nearly the last hurrah. In 1965 the Americans began their Gemini manned space flights and began to dismantle the Soviet lead in space. Korolev's own projects were approved but required a continuous battle for resources against the higher-priority ballistic missile programs.

Korolev was diagnosed with cancer some time in 1965 but kept it a secret from his colleagues. In January 1966 he checked into a Moscow hospital. The Minister of Health himself elected to conduct the colon surgery – not his area of expertise. It all went horribly wrong, and Korolev died on the operating table. His untimely death at 59 was a huge blow to the Soviet space program. His successor, Mishin, did not have the necessary talents and standing to push Korolev's moon project through to a successful conclusion. Just two weeks after Korolev's death his Luna 9 probe soft-landed on the moon and sent back the first close-up views of the surface. It was the last significant Soviet space first.

Korolev's talents were immense vision, enthusiasm and energy that motivated his co-workers and subordinates. His personal attention to detail ensured that critical equipment was of the highest quality and that manned space flights were safely conducted. He had to be enormously persistent and convinced of the rightness of his views to push his projects forward against immense opposition and competition.

But these qualities became less appropriate as the projects increased in number and scope. Korolev's refusal to compromise on technical issues resulted in alienation of other chief designers, most notably Glushko, forcing him to lose years of time developing new sources of rocket engines. The Americans required the resources and expertise of four major contractors to develop the Saturn V booster and the Apollo spacecraft. Korolev was attempting to do the same within a single industrial enterprise. He left his successor, Mishin, with a seemingly impossible task. Then again, had he lived a few more years in good health, perhaps he could have beat the Americans to the moon…and gone on to Mars, one improvised step at a time…



Subtopics

Korolev bureau Russian manufacturer of rockets, spacecraft, and rocket engines, Kaliningrad, Russia.

Country: Russia, Ukraine. Spacecraft: Vostok, Voskhod. Projects: Luna, Venera. Agency: Korolev bureau. Bibliography: 283, 375, 5642.
Photo Gallery

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Vostok 1Vostok 1
Gagarin with Korolev before flight.
Credit: RKK Energia


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Korolev during Vostok 1 flight.
Credit: RKK Energia


Female cosmonautsFemale cosmonauts
Female cosmonauts with Korolev.
Credit: RKK Energia


Korolev/KurchatovKorolev/Kurchatov
Architects of the Soviet nuclear deterrent.
Credit: RKK Energia



1907 January 12 - .
1938 March 23 - .
1938 June 7 - .
1938 September 27 - .
1939 June 13 - .
1940 September - .
1944 November - . Launch Vehicle: RDD.
1946 August 9 - . LV Family: V-2. Launch Vehicle: R-1.
1946 August 30 - . LV Family: V-2. Launch Vehicle: R-1.
1947 May 22 - . LV Family: Groettrup. Launch Vehicle: G-1.
1948 December 28 - . LV Family: Groettrup. Launch Vehicle: G-1.
1949 June - . Launch Vehicle: R-3.
1949 December 7 - . Launch Vehicle: R-3.
1950 January 1 - . Launch Vehicle: MKR.
1953 January - . LV Family: R-12. Launch Vehicle: EKR.
1953 April - . Launch Vehicle: Buran M, Burya La-350.
1953 August 12 - . LV Family: R-5. Launch Vehicle: R-5M.
End of 1953 - . LV Family: R-12. Launch Vehicle: Kosmos 2.
1954 May 20 - . Launch Vehicle: Buran M, Burya La-350.
1955 May 30 - .
1956 During the Year - .
1956 February 27 - . Launch Vehicle: R-7.
1956 June - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok 8K72.
1957 During the Year - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1957 March - .
1958 May 1 - .
1958 June 1 - .
1958 July 1 - .
Summer 1958 - . Launch Vehicle: R-16.
1958 September 23 - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok-L 8K72. FAILURE: Launcher disintegrated 93 seconds after launch due to longitudinal resonance of strap-ons.. Failed Stage: 0.
1958 November 1 - .
1959 February 20 - . LV Family: RT-2. Launch Vehicle: RT-1.
1959 May 17 - .
1959 December 31 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1960 January - .
1960 January 15 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Molniya 8K78.
1960 March 3 - .
1960 May 30 - .
1960 June 23 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1960 June 23 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1961 January 5 - . Launch Vehicle: R-16.
1961 January 20 - .
1961 January 31 - .
1961 February 4 - . 01:18 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Molniya 8K78. FAILURE: At T+531 sec, the fourth vernier chamber of Stage 3's 8D715K engine exploded because the LOX cut-off valve had not closed as scheduled and LOX flowed into the hot chamber.. Failed Stage: U.
1961 February 12 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1961 February 12 - . 00:34 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Molniya 8K78.
1961 February 15 - .
1961 February 20 - .
1961 March - . Launch Vehicle: RS.
1961 March 2 - .
1961 March 4 - .
1961 March 7 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok 8K72K.
1961 March 17 - .
1961 March 22 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok 8K72K.
1961 March 25 - . 05:54 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok 8K72K.
1961 March 27 - .
1961 March 28 - .
1961 March 31 - .
1961 April 4 - .
1961 April 5 - .
1961 April 6 - .
1961 April 8 - .
1961 April 10 - .
1961 April 11 - .
1961 April 12 - . 06:07 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok 8K72K.
1961 April 15 - .
1961 May 3 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1961 May 20 - .
1961 June 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1961 August 15 - .
1961 September - .
1961 October 12 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1961 October 24 - .
1961 November - . Launch Vehicle: Proton.
1961 November 15 - . Launch Vehicle: Proton.
1962 During the Year - .
1962 During the Year - .
1962 January 18 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
During February 1962 - .
1962 February 22 - .
1962 February 24 - .
1962 February 27 - .
1962 March 7 - .
1962 March 10 - .
1962 March 27 - .
1962 April 18 - .
1962 April 20 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1962 June 22 - .
1962 July 8 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Molniya 8K78L.
1962 July 13 - .
1962 July 17 - .
1962 August 3 - .
1962 August 4 - .
1962 August 7 - .
1962 August 8 - .
1962 August 9 - .
1962 August 10 - .
1962 August 14 - .
1962 August 15 - .
1962 August 22 - .
1962 September 24 - .
1962 September 25 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1962 December 6 - .
1963 January 18 - .
1963 January 21 - .
1963 March - . Launch Vehicle: RT-2.
1963 March 7 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Soyuz 11A511.
1963 March 21 - . LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N1 1964.
1963 April 9 - .
1963 April 13 - .
1963 May - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1963 May 4 - .
1963 May 9 - .
1963 May 11 - .
1963 May 13 - .
1963 May 21 - .
1963 May 28 - .
1963 June 3 - .
1963 June 10 - .
1963 June 11 - .
1963 June 14 - .
1963 June 16 - .
1963 June 16 - . 09:29 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Vostok 8K72K.
1963 June 19 - .
1963 June 20 - .
1963 June 24 - .
1963 June 25 - .
1963 July 12 - .
1963 July 22 - .
1963 July 27 - .
1963 August 2 - .
1963 August 11 - .
1963 November 23 - .
1963 November 25 - .
1963 December 16 - .
1964 January 30 - .
1964 February 5 - .
1964 March 14 - .
1964 March 27 - .
1964 April - .
1964 April 13 - .
1964 April 24 - .
1964 May 5 - .
1964 May 7 - .
1964 May 12 - . LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N1 1962.
1964 May 21 - .
1964 June 4 - .
1964 June 11 - .
1964 July 19 - .
1964 July 21 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1964 August 1 - .
1964 August 1 - .
1964 August 12 - .
1964 August 26 - .
1964 August 29 - .
1964 September 2 - .
1964 September 8 - .
1964 September 9 - . LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
1964 September 13 - . 09:50 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
1964 September 14 - .
1964 September 15 - .
1964 September 18 - .
1964 September 24 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1964 September 29 - .
1964 October 1 - .
1964 October 3 - .
1964 October 6 - . 07:12 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
1964 October 9 - .
1964 October 10 - .
1964 October 11 - .
1964 October 12 - . 07:30 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
1964 October 13 - .
1964 October 15 - .
1964 October 20 - .
1964 October 31 - . Launch Vehicle: UR-700.
November 1964 - .
November 1964 - .
1965 During the Year - . Launch Vehicle: R-56.
During 1965 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 January 9 - .
1965 January 21 - .
1965 February 3 - .
1965 February 6 - .
1965 February 8 - .
1965 February 10 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 February 12 - .
1965 February 16 - .
1965 February 17 - .
1965 February 22 - . 07:40 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC31. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
1965 February 23 - .
1965 February 25 - .
Spring 1965 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 March 2 - .
1965 March 5 - .
1965 March 9 - .
1965 March 11 - .
1965 March 12 - .
1965 March 13 - .
1965 March 16 - .
1965 March 17 - .
1965 March 18 - .
1965 March 18 - . 07:00 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC1. LV Family: R-7. Launch Vehicle: Voskhod 11A57.
1965 March 19 - .
1965 March 21 - .
1965 March 22 - .
1965 March 25 - .
1965 March 31 - .
1965 April 2 - .
1965 April 13 - .
1965 April 15 - .
1965 May 8 - .
1965 June 1 - .
1965 July 6 - .
1965 August 16 - .
1965 August 20 - .
1965 August 28 - .
1965 September 1 - . LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N1 1964.
1965 September 8 - . LV Family: Proton. Launch Vehicle: Proton-K/D.
1965 September 15 - . LV Family: , Proton, .
1965 September 16 - .
1965 September 18 - .
1965 September 22 - .
1965 September 23 - .
1965 October 25 - . Launch Vehicle: Proton.
1965 November 1 - .
1965 November 1 - .
1965 November 24 - .
1965 November 25 - .
1965 November 30 - .
1965 December 16 - .
1965 December 18 - .
1965 December 20 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 December 20 - .
1965 December 22 - .
1965 December 23 - .
1966 January 4 - .
1966 January 8 - .
1966 January 10 - .
1966 January 14 - .
1966 January 14 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1966 January 24 - .
1966 March 28 - .
1966 May 11 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
September 1966 - .
1967 July 16 - .
1968 June 23 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 October 24 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 November 13 - .
1969 January 22 - .
1969 September 1 - .
1974 August 13 - .
1974 August 14 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.

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