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Soyuz 7K-LOK
Part of Soyuz
LOK Cutaway
LOK Cutaway
Credit: © Mark Wade
Russian manned lunar orbiter. The two-crew LOK lunar orbiting spacecraft was the largest derivative of Soyuz developed. Manned Lunar orbit and return satellite, Russia. Launched 1972.

AKA: 11F93;7K-LOK;LOK;LOK, T1K;T1K. Status: Operational 1971. First Launch: 1971-06-26. Last Launch: 1972-11-23. Number: 2 . Thrust: 33.22 kN (7,469 lbf). Gross mass: 9,850 kg (21,710 lb). Unfuelled mass: 6,698 kg (14,766 lb). Specific impulse: 314 s. Height: 10.06 m (33.00 ft).

Given its importance to the Soviet moon landing program, it remains one of the least known manned spacecraft ever to reach flight status. Never reaching space in its all-up form, the LOK was the counterpart to the American CSM (Command-Service Module).

The LOK was radically different from other spacecraft in the Soyuz series in many respects. The BO orbital module differed from the basic Soyuz in having the Kontakt lightweight docking system, a forward reaction control system module, and a cupola allowing the cosmonaut to make a manual visual docking with the LK lunar lander. The descent module was true to the basic Soyuz form, but significantly heavier than either the 7K-OK earth orbit or 7K-L1 circumlunar versions of the module. The PO/AO service module was radically different from others in the Soyuz series. It featured the Block I propulsion system with a much more powerful engine and greater fuel capacity (required for the maneuver out of lunar orbit). Power was provided by Lox/LH2 fuel cells, a first for a Soviet spacecraft.

Development History - from L-4 to LOK

The first outline specification for a manned lunar orbiter came in a Korolev letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Part in January 1960. The Chief Designer proposed an aggressive program for Communist conquest of space. This would be accomplished by development of a new N1 rocket of 1,000 to 2,000 metric tons gross lift-off mass with a 60 to 80 metric ton payload at the earliest possible date. Among the potential payloads for his rocket in the period 1963 to 1965 Korolev proposed a spacecraft with 2 to 3 men for flyby of the moon, entry into lunar orbit, and return to earth. Payload mass would be 10 to 12 metric tons in lunar orbit with 2 to 3 metric tons return payload. This lunar orbiter would be twice as large as the L1 'loop around the moon' spacecraft. Following negotiations with other Chief Designers and the government, the final decree 715-296 of 23 June 1960 authorized draft project work on the L1 and the N1 booster but did not mention any N1-launched lunar orbiter.

Following three years of design and research, a series of potential lunar spacecraft designs were described in a 23 September 1963 letter setting out Korolev's space exploration plan for 1965 to 1975. One of these, the L-4 Manned Lunar Orbiter Research Spacecraft would have taken two to three cosmonauts into lunar orbit for an extended survey and mapping mission. The L-4 complex, with a total mass of 75 tonnes, would be placed into orbit in a single N1 launch, and would consist of:

At the time of this proposal Korolev favored an earth-orbit rendezvous method to reach the moon. This would require several N1 launches to assemble a 200 tonne spacecraft in low earth orbit. This would be launched directly to the lunar surface.

In August 1964 the Soviet Union finally decided to attempt to land a man on the moon before the United States. Korolev took the decision to use the American lunar orbit rendezvous method to reduce the number of N1 launches from three to one. The design work already accomplished on the L4 came in handy to provide a counterpart to the American Apollo CSM. Unlike the CSM, the Soviet LK lunar lander and LOK lunar orbiter would be braked into lunar orbit by a separate stage, the Block D. Therefore the propulsion system of the LOK would be needed only for the critical maneuver of propelling the spacecraft on the return trip for lunar orbit toward the earth. The LOK would have a smaller Block I propulsion stage than that planned for the L4:

In the original 1964 N1-L3 lunar mission scenario, the LOK, the LK lunar lander, and the Block D deceleration stage would be inserted into lunar orbit by a burn of the Block D. Trim maneuvers would bring the assembly into a 20 km x 100 km orbit by orbit 14. One crewman would spacewalk from the LOK to the LK. After separation from the LOK, the Block D stage, still attached to the LK, would act as a 'lunar crasher' stage, decelerating the LK to 100 m/s four kilometers above the surface. The LK itself would accomplish the final lunar descent. After surface exploration, the single cosmonaut would return to the LK, which would propel itself back into lunar orbit for docking with the waiting LOK and transfer of the crewman and surface samples. The single cosmonaut aboard the LOK would perform the automatic rendezvous and docking with the LK. After the cosmonaut from the LK transferred himself and the lunar samples to the LOK, the LK would be cast off on orbit 38 by jettisoning the forward modules of the LOK. One orbit later the LOK would make the engine burn to take the crew back to earth. If necessary due to weight growth, the BO living module could also be jettisoned prior to this maneuver. The LOK would spend a total of 77 hours in lunar orbit and 82 hours on the homeward coast.

Technical description of the LOK

The design mission of the LOK was house the mission crew and provide a means of escape during the trip to lunar orbit, to rendezvous and dock with the LK after its return from the lunar surface, and then return the cosmonauts and their lunar samples to earth. On precursor manned and unmanned missions the LOK would be equipped with photographic equipment to survey potential lunar landing sites. The LOK had an overall length of 10.0 m, a diameter of 2.2 m, and a total mass of 9,850 kg. It was designed to support two cosmonauts on lunar orbital missions of up to 13 days duration.

The LOK consisted of the following modules, from fore to aft:

Development and Flight History

Korolev had come up with using the lunar orbit rendezvous method for a lunar landing in response to the Soviet leadership demanding that he beat the Americans to the moon. Unfortunately, the leadership made this decision three years after the beginning of the Apollo project, and at the same time would not budget for more than four N1 launches a year. The only conceivable way of beating the Americans was to use a single N1 launch. But the N1 was designed to launch only 75 tonnes into low earth orbit, and OKB-1 calculations showed a minimum of 100 tonnes would be required for an LOR mission using Lox/Kerosene propellants in the booster.

Korolev was able to convince himself that by using a combination of modifications to the N1, chilled propellants, and modified trajectories he might be able to squeeze a 95 tonne payload out of the booster. This then had to be the total mass of the L3 assembly, including the trans-earth injection stage. This was the plan sold to the leadership, but as soon as development started it was apparent that a 95 tonne L3 would be unachievable.

The motivations for continuing were many. Mishin, Deputy Designer at OKB-1, wanted to go ahead with development of the N1 whether it could send a man to the moon or not. He believed it was critical to a range of future Soviet space projects and he was not about to kill it by telling the leadership it could not accomplish its only assigned mission. Bushuev noted the only way to get the necessary performance would be to use Lox/LH2 propellants in the second and third stages, as the Americans had done with the Saturn V. But this was not authorized in the approved draft project. Korolev was not about to tell the leadership that he had mis-estimated in their original proposal, or that Russian engines were not as good as American engines.

Two days after the N1-L3 one-shot scheme had been approved, a council of Chief Designers met to consider how to accomplish it. The use of Lox/LH2 stages was proposed to boost payload, but rejected due to the lack of Soviet experience with the propellants. The use of higher-performance N2O4/UDMH engines from Glushko was proposed, but again rejected by OKB-1. The designers became prisoners of their positions. There was no choice but to proceed with 95 tonne L3 as proposed. But this meant that the spacecraft estimated masses had no reserves. The LK mass was absurdly optimistic. During development the engineers would fight over grams of mass for subsystems.

The weight restrictions had consequences. By 20 December 1965 difficulties and arguments over development of the guidance system had reached a head. Pilyugin, the guidance subcontractor, wanted to use the latest technology in order to meet the weight and power consumption goals, including a digital computer and a gyroplatform of his own design. This was contrary to the decree, which required him to use a gyro platform from the customary supplier of OKB-1, Kuznetsov at NII-944. Pilyugin was reporting that he wouldn't have a guidance system ready for the N1 booster until late1968, let alone systems for the LOK and LK. Therefore an expert commission was convened by Keldysh, Head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Korolev kicked off the meeting by complaining that if he had another 800 kg in payload mass, existing systems could be used. Pilyugin and Ryazanskiy provided an overview of their guidance systems, showing the concepts and the mass problems. The first launches could be made with the analogue systems desired by OKB-1, but the digital system would be required to conserve fuel cell consumables and accomplish a lunar landing mission. A discussion of fuel cell contractors led to a suggestion to use radio-isotope thermal generators (RTG's) from the KB Atomic Machinery Factory in the Urals. They had worked with Korolev for years on development of nuclear electric propulsion. But it was decided that there was no technical basis for proving reliable operation of RTG's in a vacuum. In addition, the fuel cells produced water for the crew, which would have to be carried separately if RTG's were used.

A month later Korolev was dead, and OKB-1 was without a Chief Designer. The leadership argued over the subject all during 1966. In the meantime, the American Apollo program was progressing rapidly, while the L3 project languished. It had become clear that a Soviet lunar landing could not be accomplished earlier than 1970, while the Americans were hoping for a landing in 1968 if all went well. By October 1966 the launch plan had slipped to the following:

It was also becoming apparent that the weight optimists were fighting a losing battle and that the N1 simply could not accomplish the one-launch scenario. This led to an examination of alternate launch plans. Meanwhile, amid a great deal of finger-pointing in the leadership, the decision was finally taken to appoint Mishin head of what was now dubbed TsKBEM in December 1966. The program lurched forward with the actual scenario for a lunar landing in constant flux.

Hardware development experienced continued delays. By the end of 1966 the Block I propulsion system was scheduled for its first ground tests in July 1967. New communications systems (Foton and Mezon) required to handle multiple manned spacecraft were not to be installed at ground stations until the end of the year.

Bushuev came up with plan in 1967 that provided for added safety through the use of two Proton and two N1 launches to get a single man safely to the lunar surface and back. Under this scenario, two Proton rockets would launch automated Ye-8LS lunar rovers to the surface. These would scout the local terrain. The rover would park at the selected site and serve as a beacon for the LK landers that would follow. An N1 would be launched with an unmanned LOK and the backup 'reserve' unmanned LK (LKr). The LKr would land with minimum propellant consumption, homing in on the Ye-8LS beacon. The LOK would photograph the site from lunar orbit and then return the film to earth. One month later, the manned expedition would be launched. A single cosmonaut would ride a second LK to the lunar surface, again using the homing beacon. If there were any problems, the cosmonaut could walk or drive one of the rovers to the LKr and have a second chance to get back to the LOK in lunar orbit. The Ye-8LS were equipped with a driver control panel and supplies of oxygen and water for the Krechet suit. They rover reach 1.2 km/hour for a slow-motion ride to the other lander if necessary.

Also in 1967 a substantive plan for test of the LOK in earth orbit was developed. The earth-orbit versions of the LOK was dubbed the T1K. By March 1968 it was planned three flights would be made launched by Chelomei's Proton booster in October-November 1968. The last of these would be manned and involve docking with the T2K test version of the LK lunar lander. In August 1968 discussion of using the Yastreb lightweight space suit for these missions was underway, Incredibly, at the same time, fundamental arguments over the rendezvous and docking system continued. Some factions preferred the Igla system which was being proven on the orbital version of Soyuz. Others preferred the Kontakt system. The decision, inexplicable in retrospect, was to continue with the Kontakt system for the L3.

Following the successful flight of Apollo 8 around the moon in December 1968 the project managers finally realized they had no chance for beating the Americans to a lunar landing. N1's 3L through 6L would not have enough payload for a landing mission. The LOK and LK were not nearly finished and the landing scenarios had been redrafted three times since the project had begun. A council of chief designers considered the options:

A meeting of the Council of Chief Designers on 24 January 1969 made some brutal recommendations to the Soviet leadership. The T1K, T2K, and L1E were cancelled. The LOK and LK, although overweight, would continue in low-priority development. A month later the first launch attempt was made with the N1. N1 3L cleared the pad but an engine control system fault shut down all first stage engines after 68 seconds of flight. It was considered a typical first flight test and the program was not jeopardized.

On 29 and 30 May 1969 the launch commission for the next launch, N1 5L, was held. Mishin pushed for a decision, if 5L was successful, to launch the first LOK aboard N1 6L by the end of 1969. Mishin expected to have an all-up spacecraft by then, fully equipped with the fuel cells, the digital computer from NIIAP, the Kontakt docking system, and the Geofizika optical docking system. The cryogenic lox and LH2 for the LOK's fuel cells would be pumped aboard the spacecraft once the rocket was on the pad. The safety issues of handling LH2 was a source of continuing concern for the military. There was also a great deal of skepticism of Mishin's ability to produce a complete LOK by year's end.

Following the spectacular failure of N1 5L on 3 July 1969 the flight schedule was modified again. It now read as follows:

Work continued on the LOK. Arsenal was still having problems in January 1970 with the forward engine system. By February 1970, of 16 LOK's authorized, only three were in ground test for possible future flight operations. Seven were partially assembled, and the remainder existed only as unassembled parts.

A crash program had been initiated to develop the Salyut 1 space station before the American Skylab. Development of the LOK and LK were given a very low priority. On 14 April 1971, at an expert commission reviewing the N1, Keldysh suddenly changed his long-standing support for the L3 and listed a series of 'mandatory changes' which would completely invalidate the LOK/LK design. Among these were:

Just to incorporate the docking tunnel would mean a three year delay. However it was decided to ignore the demands for the time being. If the next N1 succeeded, the point could be argued; if it did not succeed, it would be moot.

It was decided not to risk functional spacecraft in further N1 tests until the booster had proven itself. Therefore 6L and 7L would carry only LOK and LK mass models, with 8L now scheduled to carry an all-up automated LOK and LK spacecraft. During 1971, LOK certification tests began in earnest, including water-landing tests and launch escape system live fire tests. The fuel cells were finally tested in 1971-1972, producing 4.5 kW at 60% efficiency.

By this time, however, Mishin's team was already concentrating on a completely new spacecraft - the L3M - that would make a direct landing on the lunar surface. This would be joined to new Lox/LH2 propulsion stages in earth orbit using multiple N1F launches - the same scenario originally advocated by Korolev. A state commission under Keldysh studied the alternatives throughout 1971, and the final conclusion was to abandon any use of the original L3 (LOK+LK) lunar orbit rendezvous spacecraft in a manned landing. The assets already built would be used only for unmanned tests of the N1. Any Soviet manned lunar landing would rely on the L3M and multiple N1F launches to support a landing no earlier than 1977. But these plans were never fully funded, and in the absence of any formal go-ahead, Mishin continued to complete qualification and flight test of the LOK.

Therefore the payload for N1 7L was changed again, to be the first actual test flight of the LOK (article 6A was selected for the honor). A mock-up of the LK would accompany it on a lunar orbital mission. The flight plan for the mission was issued on July 19, 1972. N1 7L was to place the 89,803 kg L3 stack into a 200 x 740 km earth orbit at a 50.7 degree inclination. After 24 hours of on-orbit tests the Block G translunar injection stage would hurl the payload toward the moon. However even with the underweight payload the Block G could not complete its mission in this configuration. The Block D would have to fire for 44 seconds after the Block G had depleted its propellants in order to reach earth escape velocity. In case of a failure to reach a lunar trajectory, the LOK was to separate, conduct operations in earth orbit, and then deorbit for a splashdown in the Indian Ocean.

After four days transit to the moon, with two mid-course corrections, the Block D would fire to place the assembly into a 175 km circular lunar orbit at 98.5 hours into the flight. The Block D would shape the orbit to a final 40 km x 175 km orbit on maneuvers on the fifth and 27th orbits. The LOK was to conduct photographic sessions of potential future landing sites on orbit 14, 17, 34, and 36. After 3.7 days in lunar orbit, the LOK's forward living compartment would separate and the Block I engine would fire to put the spacecraft on a translunar trajectory. Eight minutes prior to re-entry the descent module would separate, curve around the north pole of the earth, and splash down in the Indian Ocean.

The digital computer and inertial platform aboard the LOK were responsible for guiding the Block G, Block D, and LOK during all flight maneuvers after earth orbit insertion. The computer used Tropa integrated microprocessors developed by the Ministry of Electronic Industry. During integration and test of the L3 assembly at Area 2B at Baikonur, many problems arose with the digital computers. Clearing them became a pacing item for the launch. Although electrical tests were completed on 14 October 1972, computer glitches on 27 October led to further delays. At the

More at: Soyuz 7K-LOK.

Family: Lunar Orbiters, Moon. Country: Russia. Engines: KTDU-53. Spacecraft: L3, DLB Lunar Base, LOK PAO, Soyuz 7K-LOK SA, Soyuz 7K-LOK BO. Launch Vehicles: N1, N1 1969. Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Projects: Lunar L3. Launch Sites: Baikonur, Baikonur LC110L. Agency: Korolev bureau. Bibliography: 125, 164, 165, 168, 21, 283, 288, 367, 376, 474, 72, 75, 77, 89, 6898, 13123.
Photo Gallery

LOK Cutaway DetailLOK Cutaway Detail
Credit: © Mark Wade

Detailed cutaway of LOK Power Module.
Credit: © Mark Wade

Mass model of LOK descent module for reentry from lunar distances.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK OverheadLOK Overhead
Overhead view of LOK lunar orbiter.

Kontakt Docking MechKontakt Docking Mech
Kontact docking grappler. The three arms at the bottom faced outward from the docking assembly. MAI, March 1994
Credit: © Dietrich Haeseler

LOK Docking AssyLOK Docking Assy
Close-up view of LOK orientation engine unit and docking assembly at Korolev School. The docking system in this example is covered with flat plates.
Credit: Jakob Terweij

LOK reaction controlLOK reaction control
The upper half of this item is the ODOP (Orientation and docking engine section) of the LOK, mounted at the top of the orbital module. The cone at top was had grapples for snagging the hexagonal grid of the large disk on top of the LK. Propellants for the orientation and manoeuvring engines were in the tanks in this section. The bottom half of this item is similar to a test installation used on the Soyuz 7K-L1S destroyed in the several N1 launches.
Credit: © Mark Wade

Three views of sectioned LOK orbital module at MAI.
Credit: © Mark Wade

View of LOK OM toward hatch. The cupola for docking is the circular depression in the to of the wall.
Credit: © Mark Wade

View of LOK OM exterior, view toward hatch on far wall. The red covers and other exterior portholes are for the cameras of the lunar surface photography system.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK controlsLOK controls
Work station inside LOK orbital module. These are the controls for the lunar photography system.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK controlsLOK controls
LOK OM circuit breaker panel toggle switches. The two on the top left are for the Krechet and Orlan suit circuits.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module, view down from top of spacecraft toward Soyuz descent module. The main control panels of the OM fill the wall to the left. The area also holds the cabin pressurisation system and storage for the Krechet moon suit.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module, view of main control panel dummy. The standard chronograph and sequencer switches were here.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module, view up from the entry hatch from the Descent Module to the ceiling. Note air conditioning equipment.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module, equipment above the EVA hatch. These mock-ups are at the location of the spacesuit hook-ups for the single cosmonauts spacewalks to and from the LK.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module, close-up of cupola for use of cosmonaut in docking with LK.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module, docking control station. The manoeuvring panel and controls were located where the grey dummy panel is. It is flanked by hand controllers. The cosmonaut would look through the cupola to accomplish manual docking with the LK after its return from the lunar surface.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Orbital ModuleLOK Orbital Module
LOK Orbital Module control station above hatch entrance. Main controls are on the blue panel; the green panel is a breaker panel.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Descent ModuleLOK Descent Module
LOK Descent Module and Orbital Module. Note the cupola at the left top of the Orbital Module. On the opposite wall are the lunar mapping camera apertures and control station.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Descent ModuleLOK Descent Module
LOK Descent Module and Orbital Module
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Descent ModuleLOK Descent Module
LOK Descent Module detail. The ablative material is far thicker than on the standard Soyuz descent module for the re-entry from lunar distances at twice the energy as that from earth orbit.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK at KorolevLOK at Korolev
LOK exhibited at Korolev School. Living module and re-entry vehicle are at foreground; in background is Block I instrument/propulsion unit covered with heat radiating panels.
Credit: Jakob Terweij

LOK SA InteriorLOK SA Interior
View of the interior of the LOK re-entry vehicle at the Korolev School. This is the only known photograph of this part of the spacecraft. A form-fitting crew couch is seen at lower left and a single visible control panel is at centre.
Credit: Jakob Terweij

DM ThrustersDM Thrusters
Detail of thrusters of Soyuz / L1 descent module. These hydrogen peroxide monopropellant thrusters provided orientation of the capsule before and during re-entry.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Block I forwardLOK Block I forward
View of the dome covering the pressurized instrument compartment of the LOK.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Block I sideLOK Block I side
View of the LOK Block I. Noticeable are the fragile radiator panels, and the large manoeuvring thrusters at the forward end. The large cylindrical devices are sensors of the attitude control system.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK NavigationLOK Navigation
Coordinate system and sensors of the LOK astronavigation system. The 106K sensors detected the centre of the solar disk; the 107K sensor the centre of the earth or moon; and the 100K sensors fixed stars. MAI, March 1994
Credit: © Dietrich Haeseler

LOK Block I sideLOK Block I side
View of the LOK Block I instrument/rocket module. The fragile radiators, arrayed around the main fuel tank, extended away from the body of the spacecraft in flight. The silvery instrument section has numerous patch panels for connecting external wiring. The tapered interstage with stringers connected to the Soyuz descent module. Large 'mooring' thrusters arrayed around this section provided high-authority manoeuvring capability for the LOK in its rendezvous and docking with the LK.
Credit: © Mark Wade

LOK Block ILOK Block I
The LOK Block I propulsion unit at Korolev. The delicate white radiator panels have been bent over the years. The cylinder outer shell and flared base of the LOK are missing; the smaller cylinder at top is the engine unit.
Credit: Jakob Terweij

S5.51 LOK engineS5.51 LOK engine
Side view of the twin-chamber Isayev S5.51 engine used in the Soyuz 7K-LOK lunar orbiter. The two smaller chambers of the S5.52 supplemental engine protude beyond the main engine bells to either side.
Credit: © Mark Wade

S5.51 LOK engineS5.51 LOK engine
The complex plumbing fed numerous smaller attitude control thrusters at the base of the LOK.
Credit: © Mark Wade

N1-L3 shroudN1-L3 shroud
Rare shot of n N1-L3 shroud separation test. Proof that the hardware development reached an advanced phase.
Credit: RKK Energia

LOK-LK DrawingLOK-LK Drawing
Unusual alternate diagram of LOK and LK lunar craft in docked configuration, with bottom view of LK. Korolev School.
Credit: Jakob Terweij

Panorama MAI ExhibitPanorama MAI Exhibit
Panorama of launch vehicles and spacecraft exhibited at Moscow Aviation Institute. The BO and SA of the LOK are at the right; the Block I is at middle left, in front of an L1 Block D.
Credit: Ed Cameron

Korolev and IsayevKorolev and Isayev
Credit: © Mark Wade

GE Apollo vs SoyuzGE Apollo vs Soyuz
Comparison of GE Apollo and Soyuz LOK lunar orbiter spacecraft.

LOK Lunar OrbiterLOK Lunar Orbiter
The Soyuz 7K-LOK lunar orbiter spacecraft to be used in the L3 lunar landing project complex.
Credit: © Mark Wade

Credit: Manufacturer Image

N1-L3 drawingN1-L3 drawing
N1-L3 drawing at Kaluga
Credit: © Mark Wade

L3 CutawayL3 Cutaway
Dimensioned Russian cutaway drawing of L3 manned lunar landing complex.

1964 July 19 - .
1964 July 21 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1964 July 27 - .
1964 August 1 - .
1964 October 28 - .
November 1964 - .
During 1965 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 February 10 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
Spring 1965 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 July 6 - .
1965 September 1 - . LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N1 1964.
1965 September 6 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 December 20 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1965 December 31 - . LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N1 1964.
1966 January 24 - .
1966 February 17 - .
1966 March 6 - .
1966 March 23 - .
1966 May 11 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1966 May 31 - .
1966 September 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
September 1966 - .
1966 September 2 - .
1966 September 14 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1966 September 17 - .
1966 November 1 - .
1966 November 10 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1966 November 16 - .
1966 November 21 - .
1966 December 2 - . LV Family: N1, Proton, .
1966 December 31 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1967 February 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1967 February 4 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1967 March 14 - .
1967 March 15 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1967 August 2 - .
1967 August 15 - .
1967 October 4 - . LV Family: N1.
1967 October 14 - .
1967 October 15 - .
1967 October 21 - .
1967 November 14 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1967 November 25 - .
1967 December 3 - .
1967 December 15 - .
1968 January 17 - .
1968 January 23 - .
1968 February 1 - .
1968 March 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 March 7 - .
1968 March 13 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 March 13 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 July 10 - .
1968 July 12 - .
1968 July 29 - .
1968 August 2 - .
1968 October 24 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 November 21 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 December 12 - . Launch Vehicle: Spiral 50-50.
1968 December 23 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 December 25 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1968 December 26 - .
1969 January 23 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1969 January 25 - . LV Family: N1, Proton.
1969 January 27 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1969 January 29 - .
1969 February 9 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1969 March 20 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1969 May 10 - .
1969 May 29 - .
1969 June 10 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1969 August 1 - . LV Family: Proton. Launch Vehicle: Proton-K/D.
1969 September 1 - .
1969 September 3 - .
1969 October 5 - .
1969 October 19 - .
1970 February 26 - .
1970 September 24 - .
1970 October 16 - .
1970 October 23 - .
1970 October 24 - .
1970 October 28 - .
1970 December 30 - .
1971 January 5 - .
1971 January 27 - .
1971 March 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1971 April 14 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1971 June 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1971 June 26 - . 23:15 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC110L. LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N-1 11A52. FAILURE: First stage failed.. Failed Stage: 1.
1971 July 23 - . LV Family: N1.
1972 January 1 - .
1972 August 21 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1972 September 1 - .
1972 November 16 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1972 November 21 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1972 November 23 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1972 November 23 - . 06:11 GMT - . Launch Site: Baikonur. Launch Complex: Baikonur LC110L. LV Family: N1. Launch Vehicle: N-1 11A52. FAILURE: Failure. Failed Stage: 1.
1974 May 1 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.
1974 August 13 - .
1974 August 14 - . Launch Vehicle: N1.

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