Born: 1919-10-01. Died: 2009-03-07.
Kozlov was Lead Designer for the R-7. He was then tasked with putting the world's first ICBM into production at the Progress Aircraft Factory in Kuibyshev (Samara). For that purpose he was made head of the Production Engineering Section 25 of Korolev's bureau on 23 July 1959. In 1960 Kozlov's Samara office was renamed Filial 3 of OKB-1 and took over design responsibility for all future derivatives of the R-7 rocket.
In 1964 Korolev spun off to Kozlov the same responsibilities for the Zenit photo-reconnaissance satellites and military versions of the Soyuz. Interference from headquarters led to the Kozlov giving up Soyuz versions in 1968. In 1974, with the cancellation of the N1 project and the dissolution of TsKBEM, Kozlov was given complete independence as the Central Specialized Design Bureau (TsSKB). He had been offered the post of head of the new NPO Energia but preferred to remain in Samara. There he became the pre-eminent supplier of reliable optical reconnaissance satellites and launch vehicles for the Soviet military. He later expanded into new areas of unmanned satellite design in the 1980's.
|Kozlov bureau Russian manufacturer of rockets and spacecraft. Samara, Russia.
Council of Soviet Ministers (SM) Decree 'On approval of work on the R-5M missile and on establishment of OKB-586 at Dnepropetrovsk Plant No. 586' was issued. Sadoviy and Kozlov were named to lead the project. Based substantially on the R-5, it used the 8U25 launch portable launch stand.
Technical documentation completed for the serial production of the Zenit-2 photo reconnaissance satellite. OKB-1 filial number 3, based in Samara (then Kuibishev), headed by Chief Designer Dmitri Ilyich Kozlov, was also responsible for future development and production support of derivatives of the R-7 family of launch vehicles.
The capsule was recovered 45 km southeast of Votinsk. The mannequin was ejected successfully from the aircraft, the dog Zvezdochka was fine, and was displayed to journalists all day. Therefore all is ready for a manned flight. The cosmonauts agree: 'Everything is finished, we can fly'. All is ready for a one-orbit flight with recovery in the USSR, but Kamanin still worries about the lack of any realistic plan in emergency situations. The environmental control system has still not completed endurance tests, and won't be able to keep the cosmonaut alive for the ten to twelve days it would take the spacecraft to decay from orbit if the retrorocket fails. Trials with the hot mock-up of the ECS in the capsule have still not been successful. Furthermore, a recovery at sea is not practical.
The pace quickens leading to the first human spaceflight. Kamanin coordinates matters with Korolev and Voronin, and then discusses the ECS problems and cosmonaut landing issues with Dementiev. Plans are made for a meeting with Ustinov and Kozlov. In the evening a meeting of the General Staff is held. Decisions made: 1) Announce the name of the cosmonaut as soon as he is in orbit; 2) improve VVS support (aircraft, helicopters) needed to pick up the cosmonaut immediately after landing; 3) issue a formal letter to Moskalenko on rules for filming of the cosmonaut at the launch site; 4) organise an examination of the 11 cosmonauts not in the group of six now being prepared for flights.
The Soviet leadership attends a secret exhibition of Soviet rocket technology in a sporting hall at Pitsunda, on the Black Sea. The Chief Designers offer competing designs. It is decided that the R-16, R-9, UR-200, UR-500, and N1 will go forward. Yangel's R-56 is rejected. Additional Details: here....
The Soviet leadership reviewed missile development since the Pitsunda meeting. Both the Yangel R-26 and Chelomei UR-100 were proposed as small ICBM's to be put into mass production as a counter to the American Minuteman. The UR-100 was an ampulised missile with a guaranteed ten-year storage life. Yangel had not solved the problems of long-term storage of corrosive storable fuel yet. Therefore Khrushchev, supported by Kozlov and Brezhnev, selected the UR-100. A decree for mass production was issued on 30 May 1963.
Vostok flight plans were drastically curtailed at a meeting of the Presidium of the Communist Party. Korolev presented the plan for 1963 as approved by the Interorganizational Soviet at the beginning of the year. This plan, already in an advanced stage of execution, was rejected utterly by Kozlov and Vershinin. The Ministry of Defence announced its categorical opposition to further Vostok production. It was finally decided that there would be only two flights in 1963 using existing spacecraft. These were scheduled for June and would consist of simultaneous female and male flights. Kamanin was infuriated that although he was ordered by a leadership decree in December 1961 to train five women for spaceflight, the same leadership was now asking - Who ordered this? What was the purpose? Are we sure they're ready?
KB Kozlov began active development of the military applied versions of the Soyuz. A new version of the R-7 launch vehicle, the 11A514, was put into development to support launch of the Soyuz-P, now designated the 7K-PPK (pilotiruemovo korablya-perekhvatchika, manned interceptor spacecraft). The Soyuz-R would include the small orbital station 11F71 with photo-reconnaissance and ELINT equipment. To dock with the 11F71 station Kuibishev developed the transport spacecraft 11F72 7K-TK. This version of the Soyuz was equipped with rendezvous, docking, and transition equipment, including an airlock, that allowed the two cosmonauts to enter the station without using EVA. The launch vehicle for the 7K-TK would be the 11A511, known today as the Soyuz.
Korolev speaks privately to Chertok. Kozlov has told him it will be impossible to build an N1 with the 93 tonne payload capability until the fourth flight article. The L3 concept was still the same as in the August decree - 2 cosmonauts aboard the LOK orbiter, one aboard the LK lander. Korolev asks Chertok to take 800 kg out of the weight budget for the L3. Chertok informs him that they are already 500 kg over the August budget. This is still without all the unknowns of the automated lunar landing being solved. Additional Details: here....
Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 'On expansion of military space research and on 7K-VI Zvezda' was issued. In June 1965 Gemini 4 began the first American experiments in military space. At the same time the large military Manned Orbital Laboratory space station was on the verge of being given its final go-ahead. These events caused a bit of a panic among the Soviet military, where the Soyuz-R and Almaz projects were in the very earliest stages of design and would not fly until 1968 at the earliest. VPK head Leonid Smirnov ordered that urgent measures be taken to test manned military techniques in orbit at the earliest possible date. Modifications were to be made to the Voskhod and Soyuz 7K-OK spacecraft to assess the military utility of manned visual and photographic reconnaissance; of inspection of enemy satellites from orbit; attacking enemy spacecraft; and obtaining early warning of nuclear attack. The decree instructed Kozlov to fly by 1967 a military research variant of the Soyuz 7K-OK 11F615.
Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) Decree 145ss 'On approval of the 7K-TK as transport for the Almaz station' was issued. It was decided that the 11F71 Soyuz-R space station would be cancelled and the Almaz would be developed in its place. Almaz was assigned the index number previously allocated to the Soyuz-R station, and Kozlov was ordered to hand over to Chelomei all of the work completed in relation to the station. However Kozlov's Soyuz 7K-TK ferry was to continue in development to transport crew to the Almaz.
The Chief Designer of OKB-1, Vasiliy Pavlovich Mishin, strongly disagreed with the Zvezda design. In the place of Kozlov's 7K-VI Mishin proposed an OIS consisting of a separately-launched orbital block and a transport Soyuz. This was the exact same concept as Kozlov's cancelled Soyuz-R system, but using Kaliningrad spacecraft in the place of Samara spacecraft.
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) Decree 'On approval of the Almaz draft project' was issued. Chelomei's draft project showed the 11F71 Almaz station to consist of an 11F75 orbital block and an 11F74 VA landing apparatus (derived from the Apollo-type capsule he had designed for his LK-1 circumlunar spacecraft). Launch of the re-entry capsule with the cosmonauts would eliminate the need for the Soyuz 7K-TK ferry under development by Kozlov.
Decree 715-240 'On the Creation of Space Systems for Naval Reconnaissance Comprising the US sat and the R-36-based booster -further work on the US naval reconnaissance satellite, approval of work on the Yantar-2K, and course of work on 7K-VI Zvezda'.
An entire family of Yantar spacecraft was proposed by Kozlov's design bureau during the initial development; information on two film return models has been declassified. Yantar was initially derived from the Soyuz spacecraft, including systems developed for the Soyuz VI military model. During design and development this changed until it had very little in common with Soyuz.
Following numerous problems in the first flight tests of the Soyuz 7K-OK, Kozlov ordered a complete redesign of the 7K-VI manned military spacecraft. The new spacecraft, with a crew of two, would have a total mass of 6.6 tonnes and could operate for a month in orbit. The new design switched the positions of the Soyuz descent module and the orbital modules and was 300 kg too heavy for the standard 11A511 launch vehicle. Therefore Kozlov designed a new variant of the Soyuz launch vehicle, the 11A511M. The project was approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, with first flight to be in 1968 and operations to begin in 1969. The booster design, with unknown changes to the basic Soyuz, did not go into full production.
The 7K-VI military Soyuz was supposed to have been built on the basis of the 7K-OK model, with a first flight in December 1967. After all the problems with the 7K-OK, Kozlov replaced most subsystems and ended up with a basically new spacecraft, the Zvezda, which will have a mass of 6.3 to 6.6 tonnes. Officially first flight was set for the second half of 1968, but Kozlov says that even a flight in 1969 may not be possible. They simply can't meet the 21 July 1967 decree to have the spacecraft in service in 1968 - they need a further 18 to 24 months of development time. In Kamanin's opinion, this whole approach has been mismanaged. Urgent military experiments could have been flying long ago on a series of Voskhod flights. Furthermore there is no trainer yet for the 7K-VI. Kozlov says simply that he is not responsible for providing a trainer. Resort has to be made to a new design bureau set up specifically to produce simulators, headed by Darevskiy.
Kamanin recommends the death benefit to be awarded to Belyayev's family. There is to be a one-time payment of 2,000 roubles to his wife; 1,100 roubles to his daughter; 180 roubles/month pension to the wife; 75 roubles/month to the daughter; access to cosmonaut centre sanatoriums; and a seven-room apartment in Moscow.
Kamanin also reviews the government decree on the DOS-7K space station program. The Ministry of Defence is against it - they want to continue with the Almaz and Soyuz VI projects already underway. DOS will bring both of these to a halt. This is a repeat of the situation in 1967. Kozlov was making good progress on the original Soyuz VI, when it was killed by Mishin. Now three years later Mishin's Soyuz VI is put on the back burner. The Soyuz 7K-OK is still the only manned program brought to completion. Kamanin blames all this on Ustinov and Smirnov's stupid political manoeuvring. The DOS decree has not one word on the training of cosmonauts for these space station missions...
Mishin is attempting to set up a separate training centre for civilian cosmonauts at the Moscow Aviation Institute. Mishin and the civilian cosmonauts come to view the TsPK premises to get ideas. This is a new attack by Mishin, in Kamanin's eyes. Mishin has been ill for a long time, but it doesn't stop him from meddling in the details of work of his deputies. Now they are working on a Big Orbital Station (BOS) for 9-12 crew. This amounts to nothing more than a new move against Chelomei. Mishin is intent on monopolising manned spaceflight at any cost. He attempts to take over any other such projects allocated to Chelomei or Kozlov.
The N1 program was cancelled before the next test flight. Mishin was removed as head of NPO Energia. Kozlov is first asked to replace him, but he prefers to stay in Samara. Glushko is appointed as the second choice. Two fully assembled (serial numbers 8L and 9L), and four partially assembled rockets were available at time of cancellation. These would have been the first to use the new modernized series NK-33/NK-39 engines. 8L was planned for launch in the fourth quarter of 1974. Confidence was high that, based on the massive telemetry received on the 7L flight, that all problems would have been rectified. A total of 3.6 billion rubles was spent on the N1-L3 program, of which 2.4 billion rubles went into N1 development. Those on the project felt that they were within months of finally providing the Soviet Union with a heavy-lift booster. Instead the work was discarded, and Glushko began design of the RLA/Vulkan with entirely new configuration and engines.
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) Decree 'On separation of TsSKB from NPO Energia and creation of the Volzhkiy Branch' was issued. After the fall of Mishin, Kozlov was offered the Chief Designer job. He rejected it and Glushko was made head of a reorganised NPO Energia. KB Kozlov itself was made a separate entity with the name of Central Specialised Construction Bureau.