The Navy space proposal to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, during the tenure of that organization's interim surveillance over national space projects, was known as Project Mer. This plan involved sending a man into orbit in a collapsible pneumatic glider. The glider and its occupant would be launched in the nose of a giant launch vehicle. After the glider had been placed in orbit, it would be inflated, and then flown down to a water landing.

On the basis of the immense delta-winged M-50 bomber Myasishchev proposed the RSS-52 aerospace vehicle. The M-50 derivative would enter a circuit 1,000 km from base, accelerate to supersonic speed, and then launch the M-44. The M-44 would accelerate to hypersonic velocity, conduct a high speed run of an overwater circuit, and then splash down in the sea. In the United States, the X-15 was being developed to answer analogous questions. However due to the expense and technical problems, Myasishchev was unable to convince the leadership to approve the RSS-52.

Phase One would take an experimental vehicle up to 6,000 to 7,000 km/hour at altitudes of 80 to 100 km. In this phase the vehicle would remain controllable using aerodynamic surfaces. Phase Two would take the vehicle to Mach 10, and 100 to 150 km altitude. This would require solving problems of control at hypersonic speeds, reaction control of the vehicle outside of the atmosphere, re-entry, and landing.

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden and DeMarquis D. Wyatt, Assistant to the Director of Space Flight Development, described the long-range objectives of the agency's space program: a multimanned orbiting space station; a permanent manned orbiting laboratory; unmanned lunar probes; and manned lunar orbital, lunar-landing, and-ultimately-interplanetary flight.

In 1958-1959 Makeyev designed and built the first mock-up of a new design missile to rectify the shortcomings of the R-11. The R-17 would later become infamous around the world as the 'Scud-B'. The decision was made to devote the Makeyev bureau to sea-launched missiles, and in 1959 the program was transferred to Votkinsk Machine Building Plant.

In 1958, the year after Sputnik 1, Krafft Ehricke, then with General Dynamics' Convair Division, designed a four-man space station known as Outpost. Ehricke proposed that the Atlas ICBM being developed by Convair could be adapted as the station's basic structure. The Atlas, 3 m in diameter and 22.8 m long, was America's largest rocket at the time.

In 1958 H. Kurt Strass and Caldwell C. Johnson of NASA's Space Task Group at Langley Field, Virginia.sketched a spacecraft design concept for a two-man orbiting laboratory to be launched by an Atlas-Vega booster. This was one of the earliest sketches of a two-crew Mercury follow-on. The Vega stage was dropped in favour of the Agena a year later, and a similar one-crew Mercury-Agena space station was proposed by McDonnell some years later.

At Cooke AFB, AFBMD retained responsibility for construction of technical facilities as well as research and development activities. At Los Angeles, the entire staff of AFBMD's Deputy Commander for Plans and Operations, under Colonel William R. Large, Jr., was transferred to man the new Office of the Assistant Commander-in-Chief, SAC (SAC/MIKE), that was established at AFBMD to manage IOC activities.

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division's recommendation for a strong astronautics program, forwarded to Lt General D. L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, at Air Force headquarters, included the following specific proposals: (1) Thor plus a Vanguard second stage would be used as the basic booster to provide a vehicle with a recoverable data capsule: first orbital flight with telemetry only by September 1958, followed by four additional flights during the remainder of fiscal 1959. (2) Develop a recoverable animal carrying satellite using rhesus monkeys; four flights during fiscal 1959. (3) Lunar impact missions could be attempted with a high probability of success by adding a Vanguard third stage to the Thor and Vanguard second stage vehicle; four vehicles should be planned for this mission beginning during the last quarter of 1958, (4) Four vehicles should be assigned the mission of circumlunar flight. Total cost of these programs was estimated at $26.8 million during fiscal 1958, and $30.4 million in fiscal 1959 including ground equipment and Thor production would have to be increased by two units per, month if the entire astronautics program were adopted as proposed. (Msg, WDG-I -Z, Cmdr AFBMD, to Cmdr AIDC, 3 Jan 58.)

The American Rocket Society and the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel issued a summary of their proposals for a National Space Establishment. The consensus was that the new agency should be independent of the Department of Defense and not, in any event, under one of the military services.

The first clarification to emerge from the nation's amorphous space policies was revealed on 15 November 1957 when Secretary of Defense McElroy told a press conference he was thinking of centralizing control of space research and development in a special agency, This was the first public announcement of the future birth of ARPA, as it was later called-the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Confirmation of this intent was stated in the President's State -of-the -Union message to Congress on 9 January 1958, when he said that Secretary McElroy "has already decided to concentrate into one organization all the anti-missile and satellite technology undertaken within the Department of Defense. " (History, HqARDC, 1 Jan 31 Dec 1958, Vol 1,prep by ARDC Hist Div, p.7.)

The booster functioned well, the cruise stage separated at 22 km and Mach 3.15. The ramjets ignited and the cruise stage flew at a sustained speed of Mach 2.8 for forty minutes over a distance of 2000 km. Then the vehicle began a turn for the return to the Cape for recovery. However it seemed the turn was not fast enough; ground control took over, and yet again the right ramjet flamed out in a ground-piloted bank. The missile was commanded into a terminal dive at sea.

President Eisenhower, answering a December 10, 1957, letter from Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin regarding a summit conference on disarmament, proposed that Russia and the United States '. . . agree that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes.' This proposal was compared dedicate atomic energy to peaceful uses, an offer which The Soviets rejected.

Chief problems were safe re-entry and recovery of a manned space capsule. Deceleration through re-entry might well exceed the. limits of human tolerance. Experimental evidence, however, suggested that forces high as 18 g's might be tolerated for short periods and that an actual series of tests conducted in Berlin had human subjects enduring 15 g's as long as two minutes without harmful effects., The effect of weightlessness was far more difficult to assess and nearly impossible to simulate for any appreciable length of time other than through actual orbital experimentation. The weight of evidence suggested that manned entry into space and return to earth would be a difficult, but far from impossible, task and the scientific and engineering arts could control the space environment within limits of human tolerance. (Memo, Col L. D. Ely, to Col C. H. Terhune, 13 Jan 58, subj: Additional Human Factors Information.)

Successfully fired at 2024 hours EST from AMR. The flight was successful in that all missions were accomplished.. The missile followed its predicted trajectory closely. Impact was 370 meters over and 86 meters to the tight of the predicted impact point, a radial miss distance of 380 meters. This wee the fifth complete flight test of warhead and fuse system. Missed aimpoint by 286 m.

NACA adopted a resolution recommending that the national space program be a cooperative effort by DOD, NACA, the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation, together with the universities, research institutions, and industrial companies. NACA viewed the development and operation of military space vehicles as the responsibility of DOD, while NACA's primary interest lay in the scientific exploration of space.

Paul E. Purser and Maxime A. Faget conceived of a solid-fuel launch vehicle design for the research and development phase of a manned satellite vehicle project. This launch vehicle was later designated Little Joe. When Project Mecury began in October 1958, the purposeof the Little Joe phase was to propel a full-scale, full-weight developmental version of the manned spacecraft to some of the flight conditions that would be encountered during exit from the atmosphere on an orbital mission. Also, Little Joe tests were used to perfect the escape maneuver in the event of an aborted mission.

The first rough draft of a development plan for the Air Force space weapons development and technology program was completed by the ballistic missile division. This was oriented to meet five basic requirements: reconnaissance, communications, manned space flight, technical development and experimental support. To accomplish these objectives it was necessary to make maximum use of Air Force missile hardware and pursue a "daring and bold merger of the aeronautics and manned aircraft experience of the last decade with the rocket and ballistic missile experience in recent years." The program' s fiscal 1958 funding needs were estimated to be as follows: astronautics, $16 million; additional Thor hardware and launch complex for the advanced astronautics program, $10 million. (Memo,. Col C. H. Terhune, Dep Cmdr, Weapon Sys, AFBMD, to Cmdr ARDC, 16 Jan 58, subj: AF Astronautics Development Program.)

Representatives of Aeronutronic Systems, Inc. , visited the ballistic missile division to present their concept of an Air Force astronautics program. Their program was based on use of existing hardware and conservative evaluation of new equipment. to be obtained through technical evolution. Test flight of earth satellites and lunar vehicles would acquire necessary data concerning the space environment. Specific goals included biomedical experiments, development of precision orbital flight, recovery and reconnaissance systems, and lunar impact. From this background of successful technical achievement the program would move to manned satellite flights, lunar flights and manned space exploration. This program was designed to lead to manned flight in approximately four to six years. (Memo, Col L., D. Ely, to Col C. H. Terhune, 23'Jan 59, subj: Astronautics Briefing by Aeronutronic Systems, Inc.)

Lt General S. E. Anderson, Commander, Air Research and Development Command. outlined the command concept of the missile division's space mission. This was in reply to General Schriever's proposals of 18 December 1957. Said Anderson: "It is our intention to make maximum use of the peculiar talents of your Division while at the same time bringing capabilities of all elements of the Command to bear upon the problems in this area. " Therefore it was the view of the commander that the division should concentrate on ". .,. the development and model improvements. of certain scheduled space systems to include both planning and management associated therewith.: " In application this policy meant that the division would in "certain instances perform technical developments in astronautics.," The Deputy Commander for Research and Development at Command Headquarters was to retain over-all responsibility for formulation of the Astronautics Technical Development Program. (Ltr, Anderson to Schriever, ZZ Jan 58, subj: Proposal for Future Air Force Ballistic Missile and Space Technology Development.)

The Air Research and Development Command convened a committee to prepare a final planning draft of an Air Force Astronautics Program for presentation to Mr. W. M. Holaday. The Air Force proposed five year space program included development of research and test vehicles, satellite reconnaissance systems, a lunar based intelligence system, defense systems, logistic requirements of lunar transport, and strategic communications. If the program wei.accepted in its entirety, $1.156 billion in initial funding would be needed in fiscal 1959. (Memo, Col L. D. Ely, Dir Tech Div, to Col C. H. Terhune, AFBMD, 28 Jan 58, subj: Trip Report.) The Air Force invited the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) to participate in "a research vehicle program to explore and solve the problems of manned space flight. " Specifically, the Air Force objective was to achieve the earliest possible manned orbital flight which would significantly contribute to development of "follow-on scientific and military space systems." An immediate decision was therefore necessary to determine the best approach to the design of an orbiting research vehicle--should it be a glide vehicle or one designed only to accomplish the satellite mission? Inasmuch as both NACA and the Air Force were well along in their investigations of the best approach to be taken in the design of a manned orbiting research vehicle it was suggested that, "These efforts should be joined at once and brought promptly to a conclusion. " Accordingly NACA was invited to collaborate with Air Research and Development Command on an over-all evaluation of relevant space plans and projects and any program resulting from the joint evaluation would be, it was suggested, "managed and funded along the lines of the X-15 effort. " Specific guide lines were furnished the Advisory Committee to facilitate its response to the Air Force request. (Ltr, Lt Gen D. L. Putt, DCS/D, Hq USAF, to Dr. H. L. Dryden, Dir NACA, 31 Jan 58, no subject.)

After surveying 111 potential bidders, the USAF issued Requests for Proposal to ten companies (Bell, Boeing, Vought, Convair, Douglas, General Electric, Lockheed, Martin, North American, Western Electric). Later McDonnell, Northrop, and Republic were also issued RFP's.

A conference was held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to review concepts for manned orbital vehicles. The NACA informally presented two concepts then under study at Langley Aeronautical Laboratory: the one proposed by Maxime A. Faget involved a ballistic, high-drag capsule with heat shield on which the pilot lies prone during reentry, with reentry being accomplished by reverse thrust at the apogee of the elliptical orbit involving a deceleration load of about 8g, and proceeding to impact by a parachute landing; the other Langley proposal called for the development of a triangular planform vehicle with a flat bottom having some lift during reentry. At this same meeting there were several Air Force contractor presentations. These were as follows: Northrop, boost-glide buildup to orbital speed; Martin, zero-lift vehicle launched by a Titan with controlled flight estimated to be possible by mid-1961; McDonnell, ballistic vehicle resembling Faget's proposal, weighing 2,400 pounds and launched by an Atlas with a Polaris second stage; Lockheed, a 20 degree semiapex angle cone with a hemispherical tip of 1-foot radius, pilot in sitting position facing rearward, to be launched by an Atlas-Hustler combination; Convair reviewed a previous proposal for a large-scale manned space station, but stated a minimum vehicle - a 1,000-pound sphere - could be launched by an Atlas within a year; Aeronutronics, cone-shaped vehicle with spherical tip of 1-foot radius, with man enclosed in sphere inside vehicle and rotated to line the pilot up with accelerations, and launched by one of several two-stage vehicles; Republic, the Ferri sled vehicle, a 4,000 pound, triangular plan with a two-foot diameter tube running continuous around the leading and trailing edge and serving as a fuel tank for final-stage, solid-propellant rockets located in each wing tip, with a man in small compartment on top side, and with a heat-transfer ring in the front of the nose for a glide reentry of 3,600 miles per hour with pilot ejecting from capsule and parachuting down, and the launch vehicle comprising three stages (also see July 31, 1958 entry); AVCO, a 1,500-pound vehicle sphere launched by a Titan, equipped with a stainless-steel-cloth parachute whose diameter would be controlled by compessed air bellows and which would orient the vehicle in orbit, provide deceleration for reentry, and control drag during reentry; Bell, reviewed proposals for boost-glide vehicles, but considered briefly a minimum vehicle, spherical in shape, weighing about 3,000 pounds; Goodyear, a spherical vehicle with a rearward facing tail cone and ablative surface, with flaps deflected from the cone during reentry for increased drag and control, and launched by an Atlas or a Titan plus a Vanguard second stage; North American, extend the X-15 program by using the X-15 with a three-stage launch vehicle to achieve a single orbit with an apogee of 400,000 feet and a perigee of 250,000, range about 500 to 600 miles and landing in the Gulf of Mexico, and the pilot ejecting and landing by parachute with the aircraft being lost.

Lieutenant General Donald Putt, Air Force Director of Research and Development, sent a letter to Dr. Hugh Dryden, Director of NACA, inviting NACA participation in the Air Force effort in the manned ballistic rocket program. Dr. Dryden informed the Air Force that NACA was preparing manned spacecraft designs for submission in March 1958.

Air Research and Development Command headquarters directed the Wright Air Development Center to "investigate and evaluate" the quickest way to put a man in space and recover him. Since the crux of the problem was the obvious lack of large high performance booster, the center requested the assistance of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in finding a solution to the problem., (Chronological Space History, 1958, prep by AFBMD.)

Air Force headquarters instructed the Air Research and Development Command to expedite man-in-space projects. Air Force headquarters instructed the Air Research and Development Command, in collaboration with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to " expedite the evaluation of existing or planned projects, appropriate available proposals and other competitive proposals with a view to providing an experimental system capable of an early flight of a manned vehicle making an orbit of the earth." Furthermore, it was asserted that it was "vital to the prestige of the nation that such a feat be accomplished at the earliest technically practicable date--if at all possible before the Russians. " It was therefore important that the evaluation determine whether the objective of a manned space flight could be accomplished more readily under the Dyna Soar program or by means of an orbiting satellite. The minimum time to the first orbital flight and the associated costs were to be determined. The approach to this objective was also to furnish tangible contributions to the over-all Air Force astronautics program. Furthermore, the hazard accompanying such a flight was to be the minimum dictated by sound engineering and experimental flight safety practices. If at all possible, pilot safety was to be secured by furnishing an emergency escape system. (Ltr, Lt Gen D. L. Putt, DCS/D, Hq USAF, to Cmdr, ARDG, 31 Jan 58, subj: Advanced Hypersonic Research Aircraft.)

Secretary of the Air Force James H. Douglas urged the Secretary of Defense to approve Air Force use of Thor missiles to boost test satellites into orbit before the close of the calendar year. The Secretary of Defense was also advised that in the face of the impending establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the Air Force continue managing development of military space reconnaissance projects, first under the general direction of the Director of Guided Missiles and then under the general direction of ARPA. (Memo, SAF J. H. Douglas, to SOD, 1 Feb 58, subj: Reconnaissance Satellite.) Experimental preliminary steps to a manned space program were directed by Air Force headquarters. development command was assigned authority to develop a recoverable satellite and the first launch date was set for October 1958. The command was also instructed to conduct a moon impact program although the authority to conduct such a program had not yet been granted. Necessary planning action would be taken in order to expedite the program immediately upon approval from the Department of Defense. " (Ltr, Brig Gen H. A. Boushey, DCS/D, Hq USAF, to Cmdr ARDC, 3 Feb 58, subj: Astronautics Program.)

Explorer I, the first U.S. earth satellite, was launched by a modified Army Ballistic Missile Agency Jupiter-C. Explorer I, developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, carried the U.S.-IGY (International Geophysical Year) experiment of James A. Van Allen and resulted in the discovery of the radiation belt around the earth.

Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin in a letter to President Eisenhower stated that the Soviet Union "is ready to examine also the question of the intercontinental rockets if the Western powers are willing to reach agreement to ban atomic and hydrogen weapons, to end tests thereof, and to liquidate foreign military bases in other nations' territories. In that case, an agreement on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only would unquestionably meet no difficulties."

President Eisenhower directed the highest and equal national priority for Atlas, Titan, Thor, Jupiter, the WS 117L advanced military satellite system, and WS 224A BMEWS. This action returned the Titan program to its previous highest national priority status.

To further the national space effort pending a decision as to permanent organization, the Secretary of Defense created the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), an organization under consideration since November 15, 1957.. ARPA was authorized to direct or perform advanced projects in the field of research and development. It was also empowered to deal directly with operational elements on all aspects of ARPA projects; for example, to bypass the Army Staff and the Chief of Ordnance in dealing with the Army Ballistic Missile Agency on what was to be the Saturn project. Roy W. Johnson was named ARPA Director. ARPA was to be a centralized group capable of handling direction of both outer space and antimissile-missile projects, whose duties in the space field were to bridge the gap until Congress could consider legislative proposals for the establishment of a National Space Agency.

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy activated the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and appointed Roy W. Johnson as its first Director. ARPA was placed in charge of all DoD space programs. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy activated the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and appointed Roy W. Johnson as its first Director. ARPA was placed in charge of all DoD space programs.

The Department of Defense established the Advanced Research Projects Agency. ARPA was to direct and conduct space research leading toward operational systems. In pursuit of these objectives the agency was authorized management of projects which would be conducted by military departments and it was also empowered to contract directly with individuals, private business organizations, scientific institutions and public agencies. (DOD Dir 5105.15, 7 Feb 58, subj: Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.)

A greatly expanded NACA program of space flight research was proposed in a paper, "A Program for Expansion of NACA Research in Space Flight Technology," written principally by senior engineers of the Lewis Aeronautical Laboratory under the leadership of Abe Silverstein. The goal of the program would be "to provide basic research in support of the development of manned satellites and the travel of man to the moon and nearby planets." The cost of the program was estimated at $241 million per year above the current NACA budget.

Air Research and Development Command headquarters forwarded further instructions to the missile division as a guide to planning for a space program. The research command was to proceed, when Department of Defense approval was obtained, with development of a ballistic research and test system (WS 609A, later called Blue Scout), specifically designed to satisfy most research flight test requirements. In addition, the Thor missile was to be used as a booster for (1) "Able" re-entry tests; (2) recoverable satellites; (3) and moon impact. The latter program was not yet finally approved but planning actions were authorized to "expedite this project immediately upon receipt of DOD approval" and $1 million had been set aside to cover initial project costs. (Msg, RDX-2-I-E, Hq ARDC to AFBMD, 10 Feb 58.)

The ballistic missile division informed command headquarters that as many as 14 Thor boosters would be available during the calendar year for special purpose flights. These were tentatively allocated as follows: three were assigned to Phase I "Able" series flights, six were assigned to the program for recoverable satellites, and five were assigned to Phase II "Able" for continued development leading to a Thor ICBM capability. (For a time Thor plus a second stage and warhead was considered as a means of acquiring an early emergency ICBM inventory well ahead of Atlas and Titan.) However, only eight additional launchings could be scheduled through 1958--three for Phase I "Able", three for recoverable satellites to be launched one a month beginning in October, and two in support of Phase II "Able" precisely guided reentry vehicles. Thus this appeared to be the maximum effort possible in the category of space related experimental flights essential to a more advance program. If a greater effort was desirable it would be necessary to obtain additional launching facilities, a problem that might be quickly and easily solved by modifying Navaho launch stands to accept Thor vehicles. (Msg, WDT 2-7E, AFBMD to ARDC, 11 Feb 58.)

Successfully fired at 1954 hours EST from AMR. The flight was successful in that all missions were accomplished, with the exception of the Hardtack adaptation kit mission. Impact was 258 meters over and 172 meters to the left of the predicted impact point, a radial miss distance of 310 meters. The primary objectives of the test were to test the warhead and fuse system and the guidance system. Missed aimpoint by 310 m.

The Special Committee on Space Technology, established by NACA on November 21, 1957, to study and delineate problem areas that must be resolved to make space flight a practical reality and to consider recommended means for attacking these problems, met for the first time. At the meeting the new committee established seven working groups: (1) objectives, (2) vehicular program, (3) reentry, (4) range, launch, and tracking facilities, (5) instrumentation, (6) space surveillance, and (7) human factors and training. The objectives group was to draft a complete national program for space research. Other than this specific assignment, the remainder of the meeting was largely devoted to organizing the working groups. These groups were to present their first reports at the next meeting.

A report entitled, 'Basic Objectives of a Continuing Program of Scientific Research in Outer Space,' was presented by the IGY Committee. The committee was of the opinion that the need for space research would be required far past the close of the IGY in December 1958.

The Secretary of the Air Force forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, recommendations on space priorities. These recommendations "should be undertaken promptly by the Air Force. " Other than the first project, converting Thor into an intercontinental range weapon by adding a second stage, the recommendations concerned the following space proposals: (1) develop and orbit a satellite equipped with a small television transmitter to furnish weather information. A Thor plus a second stage could accomplish the first orbital launch by September 1958.: (2) Develop a recoverable satellite equipped to carry a variety of payloads which might be ejected from orbit by decelerating devices. This project would also use a Thor booster with an added Vanguard second stage which could be launched by July 1958. (3) A Thor-Hustler (later called Agena) second stage to launch a 300 pound scientific satellite by October 1958., (4) As previously recommended, the Air Force was prepared to launch a moon rocket by using a Thor plus two Vanguard upper stages. Said the secretary: "In addition to the scientific data that can be obtained from such a flight, the United States could make a major international psychological gain by beating the Russians to the moon. I urge that this Air Force approach be used. " (Memo, SAF J. H. Douglas to the SOD, 14 Feb 58, subj: Thor and WS 117L Program.)

The name of the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics was changed to Committee on Aircraft, Missile, and Spacecraft Aerodynamics to indicate clearly the committee's cognizance over problems applicable to spacecraft and missiles as well as aircraft. The Aerodynamics Committee had been studying spacecraft research problems for the past 6 years.

Some reports say that one of the four launches this day carried the dogs Palma and Pushok. The dogs were said to have died due to cabin decompression. Rumors of the death of a 'cosmonaut Shiborin' can perhaps be attributed to this incident, if indeed it did occur.

Wright Air Development Center and Air Force Missile Development Center recommended industrial sources and provided the money to study and design a life support system for manned spacecraft. WADC issued a purchase request valued at $445,954 for procurement of the study.

Air Force headquarters affirmed its strong support to demonstrate at the earliest possible date a capability to launch a satellite and to follow as soon thereafter as practicable with a moon impact. "Until such time as the Department of Defense approved early satellite launchings in support of 117L, and launch of a moon impact payload, the research command was directed to "take all actions necessary to be in position to accomplish both projects at the earliest time feasible." The command was further advised to design the first satellite as simply as possible and consider it a "warm up for subsequent more sophisticated vehicles. " Simplicity and an early launch date were considered more important than demonstrating a capability to recover payloads or otherwise demonstrate an advanced state of competence.. (Msg, AFCVC 56978, Hq USAF to ARDC, 26 Feb 58.)

Experience with the X-15 design indicated that many of the weight figures advanced by the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory for the drag or lift configurations of the reentry vehicle (later to become the Mercury spacecraft) were too low, according to Walter C. Williams, Chief of the NACA High-Speed Flight Station. Weights of auxiliary-power fuel, research instrumentation, and cockpit equipment as set by Langley were too low in terms of X-15 experience. Williams stated the total weight should be 2,300 pounds for the drag configuration and 2,500 pounds for the lifting configuration.

Successfully fired at 1459 hours EST from the AMR. The flight was successful in that all missions were accomplished. Impact was 461 meters over end 64 meters to the left of the predicted impact point, a radial miss distance of 466 meters. Missed aimpoint by 245 m.

Advanced Research Projects Director, Mr. R. W. Johnson declared the Air Force had a ". . . long term development responsibility for manned space flight capability". In pursuit of this objective the Air For ce was told to develop a Thor booster with a suitable second stage vehicle "as an available device for experimental flights with laboratory animals." Provision for the recovery of the orbiting animals in "furtherance of the objective of manned flight" was also authorized. (Memo, R. W. Johnson, Dir, ARPA, to SAF, 28 Feb 58, subj: Reconnaissance Satellites and Manned Space Exploration.)

Robert R. Gilruth, Clotaire Wood, and Hartley A. Soule of NACA transmitted a document to the Air Research and Development Command, which listed the design concepts NACA believed should be followed to achieve manned orbital flights at the earliest possible date. These were: (1) design and develop a simple ballistic vehicle, (2) use existing intercontinental ballistic missile propulsion systems, and (3) use the heat sink method for reentry from orbital conditions.

At the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, a working committee studied various manned satellite development plans and concluded that a ballistic-entry vehicle launched with an existing intercontinental ballistic missile propulsion system could be utilized fpr the first manned satellite project.

Teaming agreements between various the 13 bidders invited to participate resulted in nine proposals being submitted . The source selection board was divided. John Becker from NACA rejected any designs that corresponded with Langley's Hywards concept: high L/D ratio (typically hypersonic 2.0, subsonic 5.0) and active water cooling systems. On the other hand the USAF evaluators were not happy with intermediate research vehicles with no potential for development into an operational weapons system - as had been proposed by most bidders. The only proposals for true orbital vehicles were those from Boeing-Vought and Bell-Martin, but only the Boeing-Vought vehicle met Becker's criteria.

The Secretary of Defense approved acceleration of the 117L military satellite system, including test vehicles launched with the Thor booster--a series of orbital experiments that were also considered. The ballistic missile division was instructed to submit a complete development plan and fiscal estimate by 15 March 1958 for "review and approval."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the recommendations of his Advisory Committee on Government Organization that the "leadership of the civil space effort be lodged in a strengthened and redesignated National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics," and that legislation be enacted to "give NACA the authority and flexibility" to carry out its expanded responsibilities.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the first significant forward step to accelerate development of a space capability, reiterated the space role of the Air Force. In addition to its missile programs the Air Force was responsible for the 117L system and "... has a recognized long term development responsibility for manned space flight capability with the primary objective of accomplishing satellite flight as soon as technology permits." Furthermore, the Air Force was told it was to carry forward and accelerate the Atlas 117L project "under the highest national priority in order to attain an initial operational capability in the earliest possible date," But the proposed interim system using a Thor booster combined with a second stage and recoverable capsule "should not be pursued. " The Department of Defense did agree that a Thor booster with a suitable second stage "may be the most promptly and readily available device for experimental flights with laboratory animals" and development of such hardware including a system for recovery of animals was authorized. (Msg 03-014, Cmdr ARDC, to Cmdr AFBMD, 5 Mar 58.)

Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) Decree 293-140 'On subordinating GSNII-642 to OKB-52' was issued. On the same day Chelomei hired Nikita Khrushchev's son, Sergei, to work as an engineer in his design bureau. This gave Chelomei sudden and immediate access to the highest possible patron in the hierarchy. He was rewarded with his own design bureau, OKB-52, in 1959. This would lead to Chelomei being a key figure in the Soviet space program, even after Khruschev's ouster in 1964.

The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division proposed an over-all space objective about which all other experimental projects would be oriented. This goal was briefly stated as "Manned Space Flight to the Moon and Return. " To achieve this ultimate accomplishment many other space projects and programs would be necessary. The final goal would furnish an objective and a means to develop an integrated space program instead of isolated space ventures whose value might be unrelated to any national purpose. Admittedly, achieving this goal would require much preliminary work and completion of the following programs: Instrumented Satellite Flights and Return; Animals in Satellite Orbit and Return; Biomedical Experiments in Satellite Flights; Man in Satellite Orbit and Return; Instruments and Equipment Around Moon and Return; Animal Around Moon and Return; Instrumented Hard Landing on Moon; Instruments -Equipment Soft Landing on Moon and Return; Animal Soft Landing on Moon and Return; Man Around Moon and Return; Manned Landing on the Moon and Return (Memo, Col L. D. Ely, to Co) C. H. Terhune, 8 Mar 58, subj: Meeting with Hq ARDC Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences Panels, 10-12 Mar.)

Reports were made on recoverable manned satellite configurations being considered by NACA. One involved a blunt, high-drag, zero-lift vehicle that would depend on a parachute landing for final deceleration. Another was a winged vehicle that would glide to a landing after reentering the atmosphere. The third proposal involved features of each of the above. Besides the configuration studies, significant reports were completed relative to motion and heating, stabilization, and attitude control.

A working conference in support of the Air Force 'Man-in-Space Soonest' (MISS) was held at the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in Los Angeles, California. General Bernard Schriever, opening the conference, stated that events were moving faster than expected. By this statement he meant that Roy Johnson, the new head of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, had asked the Air Force to report to him on its approach to putting a man in space soonest. Johnson indicated that the Air Force would be assigned the task, and the purpose of the conference was to produce a rough-draft proposal. At that time the Air Force concept consisted of three stages: a high-drag, no-lift, blunt-shaped spacecraft to get man in space soonest, with landing to be accomplished by a parachute; a more sophisticated approach by possibly employing a lifting vehicle or one with a modified drag; and a long-range program that might end in a space station or a trip to the moon.

At that time, NACA was already actively engaged in research and study of several phases. For example, in the basic studies category effort had been expended on the study of orbits and orbit control, space physical characteristics, configuration studies, propulsion system research, human factors, structures and materials, satellite instrumentation, range requirements, and noise and vibration during reentry and exit. In addition, NACA outlined the complete program covering full-scale studies of mockups, simulators, and detail designs; full-scale vertical and orbiting flights involving unmanned, animal, and manned flights and recovery; and exploitation of the program to increase the payloads. As to the design concepts for such a program, NACA believed that the Atlas launch vehicle was adequate to meet launch-vehicle requirements for manned orbital flights; that retrograde and vernier controllable thrust could be used for orbital control; that heat-sink or lighter material could be used against reentry heating; that guidance should be ground programed with provisions for the pilot to make final adjustments; that recovery should be accomplished at sea with parachutes used for letdown; that a network of radar stations should be established to furnish continuous tracking; and that launchings be made from Cape Canaveral. It was estimated that with a simple ballistic shape accelerations would be within tolerable limits for the pilot. Temperature control, oxygen supply, noise, and vibration were considered engineering development problems, which could be solved without any special breakthroughs.

An Air Research and Development Command meeting held at the ballistic missile division to prepare an abbreviated development plan for the man in space program. The general Air Research and Development Command headquarters outline of the immediate planning task centered about designing a manned vehicle within a weight limitation of 2, 700-3,000 pounds which would have to contain a man, a life support system with a capacity to remain aloft for 48 hours, telemetry-communications, and a recovery system. The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division approach was directed to a more distant goal, "Man on the Moon and Return. " By the second day of the conference general agreement on program objectives had been reached. Technical recommendations included selection of an improved thrust Thor with a fluorine-hydrazine second stage, 2, 700-3, 000 pound spacecraft and a General Electric guidance system. As then planned the complete experimental and test program would require approximately 30 Thor boosters, 8 to 12 Vanguard second stages and about 20 fluorine-hydrazine second stages for testing and advanced phases of the program. By the third day an abbreviated dra.ft development plan had been completed. The conference was pervaded by a strong sense of urgency, motivated by the dramatic Air Force mission to get a man in space at the earliest possible time. Those attending the conference anticipated accelerated program approval and scheduled contractor selection to begin on or about 10 April 1958., (Memo, Col C. H. Terhune, Dep Cmdr, Tech Operations, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr, AFBMD, 25 Mar 58, subj: Man in Space Meeting at AFBMD, lu-12 March 58.)

The NACA Special Committee on Space Technology held its second meeting at the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, and preliminary reports were presented by the committee working groups on objectives and vehicular programs. The committee as a whole was briefed on the work that had been accomplished by the former NACA Committee on Aerodynamics over the past 6 years. It was stated that between 1952 and 1956, approximately 10 percent of NACA's research efforts were applicable directly or indirectly to astronautics. In 1957, the percentage of space flight research rose to 23; and at the time of the meeting, 30 percent of the aerodynamic effort and 20 percent of propulsion research was applicable to astronautics problems. The committee also heard special papers on research being conducted in fluid mechanics, satellite studies, spacecraft design proposals, boost-glide and hypersonic vehicle studies, and missiles.

An NACA report was published entitled, 'Preliminary Studies of Manned Satellites, Wingless Configuration, Non-Lifting,' by Maxime A. Faget, Benjamine Garland, and James J. Buglia. Later this document became the basic working paper for the Project Mercury development program, and was reissued as NASA Technical Note D-1254, March 1962.

An 'NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics' was held at the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett Field, California, to acquaint the military services and industrial contractors interested in aerospace projects with the results of recent research conducted by the NACA laboratories on the subject of space flight. The conference was attended by more than 500 representatives from the NACA, industry, the military services, and other appropriate government agencies. Some 46 technical papers were presented by NACA personnel, and included specific proposals for manned space flight vehicle projects. One of these was presented by Maxime A. Faget. Other papers within the category of manned orbital satellites included: 'Preliminary Studies of Manned Satellites, Wingless Configuration, Lifting Body' by Thomas J. Wong and others; 'Preliminary Studies of Manned Satellites, Winged Configurations' by John V. Becker; 'Preliminary Aerodynamic Data Pertinent to Manned Satellite Reentry Configurations' by Jim A. Penland and William O. Armstrong; and 'Structural Design Considerations for Boost-Glide and Orbital Reentry Vehicles' by William A. Brooks and others.

Air Force Undersecretary, M. A. Maclntyre, submitted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency Fiscal 1959 budget requirements if the Air Force man in space program was to meet its mid-1960 operational date: Budget Category, Amount (millions): P-100 Aircraft and Missiles: $82.0; P-200 Support: $11.5; P-300 Construction: $ 2.5; P-600 Research and Development: $37.0; Total: $133.0 If this amount was not fully funded the following projects could be progressively undertaken, but the first manned capsule launch would be delayed to some future date: (1) Development of small animal carrying capsules for use in the 117L program starting November 1958 $16 million. (2) Construction of launch pad assembly buildings and instrumentation modifications $5 million. (3) Design of man size capsule, second stage booster; development, procurement, test of support test vehicles $30 million. (4) Fabrication of a small number of capsules, second stages and boosters $15 million. (5) Design, development, test and procurement of capsules, second stages, boosters and support test vehicles leading to the earliest possible manned space flight $67 million. (Memo, Undersecretary of the Air Force, M. A. Maclntyre, to Dir, ARPA, 19 Mar 58, subj: Air Force Man-In-Space Program.)

The President's Science Advisory Committee affirmed that development of space technology was required by, human curiosity, scientific knowledge, the maintenance of national prestige, and defense. This was the first official declaration by the government that space was of military significance, but there was still no evaluation of space as a realm of military operations.

President Eisenhower gave his approval to the plans for outer space exploration announced by Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was to undertake several space projects including the launching of certain earth satellites and five space probes as a part of this country's contribution to the IGY program. The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division was authorized by ARPA to carry out three lunar probes with a Thor-Vanguard system, and lunar probes utilizing the Jupiter-C rocket were assigned to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency.

Major General B. A. Schriever, Ballistic Missile Division Commander, directed the preparation of a development plan for a full scale manned military space systems program. The goal of the program was to achieve a manned flight to the moon and return. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

The preliminary design indicated a mass of 5.0 to 5.5 tonnes, 8 to 9 G re-entry, spherical capsule, 2500 to 3500 deg C re-entry temperatures. The heat shield would weigh 1300 to 1500 kg, and the landing accuracy would be 100 to 170 km. Operating altitude was 250 km. The astronaut would eject from the spacecraft at an altitude of 8 to 10 km.

Maxime A. Faget and associates conceived the idea of using a contour couch to withstand the high g-loads attendant to acceleration and reentry forces of manned space flight. Fabrication of test-model contour couches was started in the Langley shops in May 1958, and the concept was proved feasible on July 30 of that same year.

A $61,000 contract was signed by the Yerkes Observatory, University of Chicago, and the Air Force. Gerard P. Kuiper, principal investigator, was to produce a new lunar photographic atlas. The moon's visible surface would be divided into 44 areas, and each would be represented by at least four photographs taken under varying lighting conditions. Additional Details: here....

Over the next year, the People's Liberation Army transfers 3000 technical staff and cadres to the Fifth Academy and a further 300 engineers to industry. The Chinese government sends increasing numbers of Chinese engineers to Russia for training in missile technology. All of this is done in great secrecy, with correspondence being addressed only to post office box numbers.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a message to Congress, proposed the establishment of a National Aeronautics and Space Agency into which the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics would be absorbed. The new agency would conduct the civilian space program through research in its own facilities or by contract and would also perform military research required by DOD. Projects primarily military in character would remain the responsibility of DOD. Additional Details: here....

The President, basing his recommendation on the March Z6th report of his Science Advisory Committee, stated it was essential that the nation adopt the program because it represented the next step forward in man's compelling urge to explore and discover, it would develop space technology essential to our defense, enhance our national prestige, and furnish the nation new opportunities for scientific observation and experiment which would add to man's "understanding of the earth, the solar system and the universe." The President therefore advised Congress that a National Aeronautics and Space Administration be created to furnish, "a civilian setting for administration of space functions [which] will emphasize the concern of our nation that outer space be devoted to peaceful and scientific purposes." (History, Hq ARDC, 1 Jan 31 Dec 1958, p. 13; Max Rosenberg, The Air Force in Space, 1959-1960, dtd Jun 62, USAF Hist Div Liaison Ofc, p.3.)

The Air Research and Development Command informed the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics that it had initiated a 30 day effort at the ballistic missile division to prepare a detailed development plan for "an extended manned space vehicle program of which man in space at the earliest practicable date is an integral part." The advisory committee was invited to participate in the preparation of the plan and to advise the Air Force of their anticipated action. (Msg, 04-9-01, Cmdr, ARDC, to Cmdr AFBMD, 9 Apr 58.)

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division presented briefings on the manned Military Space System Development Plan to higher Air Force and Department of Defense authorities in Washington. Also briefed were Air Research and Development Command headquarters, the Vice Chief of Staff, and R. W, Johnson, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. (Chronological Space Hist, 58.)

The first Thor/Able missile, a special test vehicle designed to examine an improved General Electric lightweight, ablative nose cone at full ICBM ranges failed. Mouse 'Mia' not recovered. This was the first small beginning of a research program to determine the requirements of a space life support system. (Msg SAFIS-3C 47151, SAF to AFBMD, 29 Apr 58.)

The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division published the first development plan for an Air Force manned military space systems program. The objective was to "achieve an early capability to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth." The program called for the start of a high priority effort (similar to that enjoyed by ballistic missiles), characterized by "concurrency" and single Air Force agency management. The complete program would be carried out in four phases: first, "Man-in-Space Soonest"; second, "Man-in-Space Sophisticated"; third, "Lunar Reconnaissance," exploring the moon by television camera and by a soft landing of an instrumented package on the moon's surface; and finally, "Manned Lunar Landing and Return," which would first test equipment by circumlunar flights returning to earth with instrumented capsules containing animals. Additional Details: here....

The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division published the development plan for an Air Force Manned Military Space Systems Program. The objective was to ". achieve an early capability to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth. The program represented a reasonable level of accomplishment with a minimum of time and money and called for start of a high priority program (similar to that enjoyed by ballistic missiles) characterized by "concurrency" and single Air Force agency management. The complete program would be carried out in four phases: first, "Man-In-Space-Soonest," was to determine functional capabilities and limitations of man in space by means of earth orbital flights--beginning with an instrumented 2,900 pound re-entry body, then a primate passenger and, finally, a manned capsule. The second, designated "Man-In-Space-Sophisticated," would use a drag type 3, 200 pound re-entry vehicle, capable of a 14 day manned space flight. This device would be used for earth orbital flight only but it would perform experiments essential to the final phase of the lunar program. The third phase, "Lunar Reconnaissance," would explore the moon by television camera and by means of a soft landing of an instrumented package on the moonIs surface. The final phase of the projected program was "Manned Lunar Landing and Return, " which would first test equipment by circumlunar flights returning to earth with instrumented capsules containing animals. At this stage of project development payload capacity would be increased to 9,000 pounds. The spacecraft would then undertake a full scale flight to the moon and safe return to earth with an animal passenger. The climax of the entire project would then be a manned lunar landing, brief surface exploration, and return to earth. This would be followed by other circumlunar flights to fully explore the moon's surface and gather additional physical data. The program was scheduled for completion in December of 1965 at a total estimated cost of $1.5 billion. Program cost estimates were based on use of Air Force rocket hardware and available ground facilities thus eliminating much new development and construction funding. However, new launch vehicle combinations would have to be developed progressing in performance as follows: a Thor-Vanguard second stage, a Thor-fluorine second stage, a "super" Titan with a fluorine-hydrazine second and third stages. Methods of landing involved use of retrorockets to insure a soft landing on the moon and return to earth through re-entry to a predetermined landing area. (USAF Manned Military Space Syst.em Development Plan, 25 Apr 58, prep by AFBMD.)

The director of the Advanced Reseach Projects Agency received a brief review of the Air Force proposed man in space program. This meeting also produced an arrangement to have the man in space development plan reviewed by the Secretary of the Air Force a Ld Chief of Staff prior to its formal presentation tu the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The director also expressed interest in ". . . the early recovery of a small chimpanzee from orbit as a prelude to man in space. " Such a flight not only would have significant scientific value but a considerable amount of psychological value a. well. Therefore the missile division was requested to analyze the value of developing a small capsule for a chimpanzee orbital flight test in addition to the man-sized capsule and to estimate the cost and possible timing of such a program. (Msg 04-29-01, Hq ARDC, to Cmdr, AFBMD, 29 Apr 58.)

Cruise stage tanks 2 and 3 were filled with water, the engine feed tank was filled with propellant, and tanks 1 and 4 were empty. Mass was reduced by 30% from that of a fully fueled stage. The boosters were fully fueled. A slightly different turbopump was installed on the engines in comparison to earlier flights. The flight was to demonstrate simultaneous control of the missile using both aerodynamic surfaces and exhaust vanes after T+50 seconds. The flight continued to T+81 seconds, when failure of an electric circuit led to premature cutoff of the boosters.

An AVCO-Convair contractor team submitted to the Air Force an unsolicited proposal for development of a manned satellite at the earliest possible date. The proposed system was built around an Atlas booster, no second stage, mounting a light double walled capsule which would rely on a steel mesh drag chute for deceleration and recovery. The proposal was analyzed by Air Force space specialists who concluded that the plan was feasible but offered little margin for error. Furthermore, weight estimates were optimistic, its orbital endurance and altitude were low and it possessed no growth potential although use of Atlas as a booster appeared to have merit. Air Force Ballistic Missile Division felt adoption of the proposal would only gain three or four months over the much more versatile Thor-fluorine combination vehicle which would also be free from the major limitations inherent in the AVCO-Convair proposal. (Memo, Col J. D. Lowe, AFBMD. to Col H. Evans, AFBMD, 16 May 1958, no subject.)

Decision to move directly to early manned flights in orbit. Korolev, after a review with engineers, determines that planned three stage versions of the R-7 ICBM could launch a manned orbital spacecraft. Korolev advocates pursuit of manned spaceflight at the expense of the military's Zenit reconnsat program, putting him in opposition to Ustinov.

The missile division published its second Man-In-Space Development Plan. This plan concentrated on the first phase of the over-all manned lunar program, designated "Man-In-Space-Soonest". During this phase of project development the launch vehicles would be a Thor-Vanguard combination for instrumented tests, and a Thor fluorine second stage combination for the manned flights. This plan, if approved, would place a man in a 150 nautical mile orbit by October 1960 at an approximate cost of $120 million. (USAF Manned Military Space System Development Plan, 2 May 1958, prep by AFBMD)

Data on bio-medical aspects of man in space were to be provided through experiments planned in the 117L program. Design, development, and fabrication of five animal containers, and associated environmental control and telemetry equipment was planned under a fiscal 1959 117L budget item of $1.3 million. In addition, $4.7 million was allocated for specialized checkout equipment, recovery devices, beacons, and necessary recovery operations for bio-medical specimens. (Ltr, Lt Gen S. E. Anderson, Cmdr, ARDC, to Cmdr, AFBMD, 22 May 58, subj: Support of Bioastronautics Program; Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

Acting on directions from General Schriever, the missile division staff prepared to establish a fluorine propulsion program. This development was to support the manned military space system, particularly the Man-In-SpaceSoonest effort which was to use a Thor-fluorine second stage. The first action was to arrange a meeting of Air Force, North American Aviation and Bell Aircraft propulsion specialists to determine the status of their fluorine propulsion programs, funds available and overall development expectations for fluorine propulsion systems. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

On instructions from command headquarters, the ballistic missile division prepared several funding alternatives to meet the amount of money that might be realistically budgeted for manned space. These were sorted out at four levels: (a) $100 million fiscal 1959 appropriation which reduced the test program for Thor-Vanguard vehicles but maintained the October 1960 date for the first manned space flight; (b) a $90 million program for the same number of vehicles but postponing the first manned flight from October 1960 to April 1961; (c) a $90 million high risk effort incurred by deleting four more vehicles from the program and retaining the October 1960 launch date; (d) a $75 million program with the same number of vehicles as (c) but delaying the first manned flight date to October 1961. (Memo, Col C. H. Terhune, Dep Cmdr, Tech Operations, AFBMD, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr AFBMD, 15 May 58, subj: Revisions to the Man-In-Space Development Plan.)

AM-5, carrying America's first tactical type re-entry nose cone, was fired from AMR at 0005 hours EST. This was also the first flight test. for first and second stage separation. Impact was 28.3 nm under and 15.6 nm to the right at a range of about 1,275 nm after approximately 960 seconds of flight. In less than five hours, the nose cone was recovered - the world's first recovery of an IRBM nose cone.

This was similar to the other two plans except it contained additional fiscal 1959 funding alternatives; i. e. , $100 million; $90 million; $75 million or $67 million. It was clearly apparent that I a major stumbling block to Air Force manned space program approval was its high cost, particularly for development of a new fluorine second stage. (Commander's Reference Book, "Chronology of Man-In-Space Effort, ~23 Mar 59.)

The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and the Air Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the principles in the development and testing of the Air Force's Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicle (Dyna Soar I). The following principles would apply to the project: (1) The project would be conducted as a joint Air Force-NACA project. (2) Overall technical control of the project would rest with the Air Force, acting with the advice and assistance of NACA. (3) Financing of the design, construction, and Air Force test of the vehicles would be borne by the Air Force. (4) Management of the project would be conducted by an Air Force project office within the Directorate of Systems Management, Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command. NACA would provide liaison representation in the project office and provide the chairman of the technical team responsible for data transmission and research instrumentation. (5) Design and construction of the system would be conducted through a negotiated prime contractor. (6) Flight tests of the vehicle and related equipment would be accomplished by NACA, the USAF, and the prime contractor in a combined test program, under the overall control of a joint NACA-USAF committee chaired by the Air Force.

The ballistic missile division briefing on Man-In-SpaceSoonest was presented at Air Research and Development Command headquarters. Present were General C. E. LeMay and "members of the Air Staff, and to Air Force Undersecretary M. A. Maclntyre and Assistant Secretary R. E. Horner. Favorable reception was accorded the briefings and the command was assured that adequate funding, "somewhere between seventy-five and one hundred million dollars" would be allocated the program for fiscal year 1959. The briefing to Maclntyre and Horner evoked a specific suggestion that an ICBM be used as a booster in lieu of developing a second stage for the Thor. The division was allowed two weeks to prepare a plan using an Atlas booster and bring it to Washington for secretarial review. (Memo, Col H. L. Evans, Asst Dep Cmdr, Space Sys, to Col C. H. Terhune, 23 May 58, subj: Trip Report.)

Major General B. A. Schriever takes on initial responsibility for the Manned Military Space System Program. In an attempt to define more clearly the role of the ballistic missile division in space projects, Major General B. A. Schriever, division commander, outlined his understanding that he was assigned initial responsibility for "planning, initiating and managing the Manned Military Space System Program. " Planning had advanced to the point of contractor selection, awaiting only allocation of sufficient funds to begin the Man-In-Space-Soonest program. Moreover, General Schriever was arranging to meet with Dr. H. L. Dryden of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, "... at the earliest practicable time," to establish the highest level of support and mutual cooperation possible. Working level conferences were already underway to develop concrete application of this cooperative interest in the program. It was also intended that other organizations were to be used as appropriate to "insure maximum utilization of the Air Research and Development Command's Resources. (Ltr, Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr, AFBMD, to Lt Gen S. E. Anderson, Cmdr, ARDC, 21 May 58, no subject.)

As in previous flight, cruise stage 30% below design weight, and propellant tanks mainly filled with water. The flight continued to T+120 seconds. The boosters worked normally and shut off at T+90.5 seconds, with the vehicle at 17.3 km altitude and flying at Mach 2.95-2.97. Simultaneously the ramjets of the cruise stage ignited. Stage separation was normal and the aerodynamic sensors and diffuser worked normally.

American Bosch Arma Corporation's contract for an all-inertial guidance system was transferred from the Titan (XSM-68) development program to Atlas (XSM-65) that was to become operational sooner. The Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL) radio-guidance system would be used on all Titan research and development missiles and for the first four Titan operational squadrons.

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division completed its fourth Man-In-Space Development Plan.This, in the form of charts rather than a formal publication, proposed use of the Atlas booster plus a second stage consisting of a Lockheed Hustler (second stage of the 117L, later called Agena) to place a man in a 150 nautical mile orbit during October 1960. Cost for this project was estimated to be $106.11 million for fiscal 1959. The plan was briefed at command and Air Force headquarters, as well as the Air Force secretariat level. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

Washington discussion of the Air Force Man-In-Space proposal continued to ferment without any sign of the approval necessary to start the program. The Advanced Research Projects Agency indicated general agreement with the Air Force space development plan and the National Security Council Planning Board displayed a "feeling of great urgency to achieve animal flights in space with safe return and to achieve the Man-In-SpaceSoonest at the earliest possible date." Other than this nebulous progress the Air Force man in space effort was no nearer realization. (Memo, Col H. L. Evans, Asst Dep Cmdr, Space Sys, to Col C. H. Terhune, 31 May 58, subj: Trip Report.)

Preliminary specifications of the first manned satellite vehicle were drafted by Langley Aeronautical Laboratory personnel under the supervision of Maxime Faget and Charles W. Mathews. After a number of revisions and additions, these specifications were used for the Project Mercury spacecraft contract with McDonnell Aircraft Corporation. A working group of representatives from the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory and the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory was formed for the purpose of outlining a manned satellite program.

Competing manned projects. Korolev OKB-1 proposed Vostok ballistic capsule as quickest way to put a man in space while meeting Zenit project's reconnsat requirements. Under project VKA-23 (Vodushno Kosmicheskiye Apparat) Myasishchev OKB-23 proposed two designs, a faceted craft with a single tail, and a dual tail contoured version. Tsybin OKB-256 proposed seven man winged craft with variable wing dihedral. Contracts awarded to all three OKB's to proceed with construction of protoypes. R-7 booster to be used for suborbital launches.

The Air Force obtained Advanced Research Projects Agency approval to proceed with study contracts on space life support systems. Ecological aspects of the manned space capsule environment were to be investigated and the study effort was to include construction of a mockup. Two three month contracts totaling $740,000 were awarded to North American Aviation and General Electric for life support system development. (Rpt, Comparison of NASA Manned Space Program and USAF Manned Military Space Proposal, Z5 Feb 60, prep by AFBMD.)

The final Series A Atlas missile (16A) was launched from Cape Canaveral. Of the eight research and development launches, five had been failures, but each had provided vast quantities of important data. Last Atlas A flight, considered fully successful. Four of the eight flights were considered successful.

The first Air Force Thor IRBM flight test missile (Number 115) to be fired from a tactical-type launcher was launched at Cape Canaveral. The missile completed a successful flight, impacting 1,170 nautical miles downrange. This was also the first Thor to be launched without a flight readiness firing of its propulsion system. USAF Thor flight tested for the first time from a tactical-type launcher at Cape Canaveral.

After serving as a liaison officer of NACA and as a participating member of an Advanced Research Projects Agency panel, Maxime A. Faget reported to Dr. Hugh Dryden on resulting studies and attending recommendations on the subject of manned space flight. He stated that the Advanced Research Projects Agency panel was quite aware that the responsibility for such a program might be placed with the soon-to-be-created civilian space agency, although they recommended program management be placed with the Air Force under executive control of NACA and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The panel also recommended that the program start immediately even though the specific manager was, as yet, unassigned. Several of the proposals put forth by the panel on the proposed development were rather similar to the subsequent evolvement. The system suggested by the Advanced Research Projects Agency was to be based on the use of the Atlas launch vehicle with the Atlas-Sentry system serving as backup; retrorockets were to be used to initiate the return from orbit; the spacecraft was to be nonlifting, ballistic type, and the crew was to be selected from qualified volunteers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Air Research and Development Command headquarters established a post of Special Assistant for BioAstronautics to the Deputy Commander for Ballistic Missiles. Life sciences personnel were to be placed on temporary duty with, or assigned to the ballistic missile division and authorized to make appropriate decisions. Command headquarters was to be informed of all decisions and through monthly reports maintain cognizance of development, fabrication, testing and scheduling of the life sciences portion of the over-all program. The Aeromedical Laboratory at Wright Air Development Center; USAF School of Aviation Medicine; and Aeromedical Field Laboratory of Air Force Missile Development Center were designated points of contact for weapon systems management organizations and contractors concerned with the life sciences experiments and hardware development. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

First attempt to launch Ernst Morhr's larege meteorological rocket. The rocket had a total mass of 150 kg, consisting of 75 kg propellant, 60 kg structure, and 15 kg payload. The motor produced 7800 kgf for 2 seconds. The rocket was 30 cm in diameter, 1.7 m long, and had a payload dart 56 mm in diameter and 1.25 m long. Three attempts were made to launch. Two hung up on the launcher, and the third was unstable after launch and crashed near the launcher.

The Air Force recommended to the OSD Ballistic Missile Committee that the last seven Atlas squadrons be in a dispersed 3x3 configuration and that the last five squadrons be hardened to 25 psi.The Air Force also recommended that the missiles in the last five squadrons be equipped with an all-inertial guidance system. The Committee approved these recommendations on 19 August.

In an agreed draft revision of its "Man-In-Space-Soonest" development plan, AFBMD proposed the use of an Atlas D booster to put the first manned spacecraft into a 115-NM orbit during April 1960. If Atlas D performance were not sufficient, an Agena or Vanguard second stage would be added.

A conference was scheduled at Air Force headquarters on 25-26 Jun 1958 to discuss the "over-all problems of the manned satellite development program." The conference was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency with representatives of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Air Research and Development Command, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, Space Technology Laboratories, and Convair invited to the meeting. Questions to be attacked were: Could the booster be an Atlas without a second stage? What would be the subsystem distribution of payload weight? What was Atlas maximum payload weight performance? question of ablation or heat sink capsule design was to be resolved before the conference. If it was concluded that Atlas weight lifting performance was inadequate an alternate choice would be the Atlas with a 117L second stage. Complete funding plans covering program options were to be available to the conferees. (Msg, AFDRD 51947, Hq USAF, to Hq ARDC, 13 Jun 58.)

The ballistic missile division informed command headquarters that reducing the orbit of a manned spacecraft from 150 to 100 nautical miles would either significantly (by 50 percent) increase the number of -stations needed for tracking and control of the manned satellite or decrease the reliability and length of contact appreciably. Also on this same date, the missile division agreed to prepare a revised manned space program which scheduled its first manned flight in April 1960--moving the date up from October by six months -by using an Atlas D booster (Chronological Space Hist, 1958..)

This plan proposed use of an Atlas booster to place a man in 115 nautical milt, orbit during April 1960. In event the performance was not up to lifting the required payload weight, a 1177L or a Vanguard second stage would be added. Costs were estimated at $99.3 million for Atlas alone, $139.51 million if a 117L vehicle were used as the second stage. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

Phase I contracts for the Dyna-Soar boost-glide orbital spacecraft are awarded by the USAF to two teams of contractors: one headed by Boeing (Aerojet, General Electric, Ramo-Wooldridge, North American, and Chance Vought), and one headed by Martin (Bell, American Machine & Foundry, Bendix, Goodyear, and Minneapolis-Honeywell). Under the $ 9 million one-year contracts each team was to refine its design, leading to a competitive down-select.

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division presented its fifth Man-In-Space-Soonest development plan to Washington decision points in the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense. The division was instructed to complete its plans for an Atlas vehicle plus a second stage as a backup in the event the Atlas could not handle the job alone. (Chronological Space Mist, 1958.)

The Advanced Research Projects Agency had not yet directed a "go ahead" for the man in space program. However, Air Force headquarters considered it a certainty that direction of an Atlas boosted manned space flight would be given to the Air Force at an early date, that funds for the project would probably total $66 million and that a series of Thor boosted, instrument and animal capsule flights would precede the Atlas full sized instrumented capsule, chimpanzee, and manned shots. The Air Force would probably re-program to obtain whatever additional funds were required to support the program. The ballistic missile division was advised that while waiting for an authoritative "go ahead" it should continue preparation of work statements for industry competition and contractor selection so they might be coordinated with the Advanced Research iProjects Agency and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. (Ltr, Maj Gen J. E. Smart, Asst V/CS, to Lt Gen S. E. Anderson, Cmdr ARDC, 19 Jun 58, no subject given, quoted in TWX, RDZGW6-33-K, Hq ARDC, to Hq AFBMD, 27 Jun 58.)

The U.S. Air Force contracted with NAA, Rocketdyne Division, for preliminary design of a single-chamber, kerosene and liquid-oxygen rocket engine capable of 1 to 1.5 million pounds of thrust. During the last week in July, Rocketdyne was awarded the contract to develop this engine, designated the F-1.

Inasmuch as availability of basic booster units threatened to limit selection of the most desirable space programs, the Secretary of the Air Force authorized an increase in missile production as follows: four more Thor boosters, delivery to begin in December 1958 at a rate of one a month; four more Atlas boosters, delivery to begin in May 1959 at a rate of one a month; and $8 million budgeted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for procurement of four additional Lockheed 117L vehicles, delivery to begin January 1959 at a rate of one a month. (Memo, SAF to C/S USAF, 24 Jun 58, no subject.)

In a US Air Force briefing a preliminary astronaut selection for the Man-In-Space Soonest project is made. The list consisted of USAF test pilots Robert Walker, Scott Crossfield, Neil Armstrong, Robert Rushworth, William Bridgeman, Alvin White, Iven Kincheloe, Robert White, and Jack McKay. This was the first preliminary astronaut selection in history. The project was cancelled when NASA was formed in and took responsibility for all manned space flight on 1 August 1958. Prospective contractors estimated it would take from 12 to 30 months to put the first American in orbit. In retrospect the orbital flight portion of NASA's Mercury program was paced by the availability of the Atlas booster. Therefore it is unlikely Man-in-Space-Soonest would have put an American in orbit any earlier than Mercury.

Successfully fired at 2059 hours EST from AMR. The flight was a success in that all missions were accomplished with the exception of failure of the thrust governor. This failure was caused by human error before firing which caused excess velocity, thereby exceeding the predicted impact point by 8.36 nm. Programmed range to impact was 137.31 nm. All other missions were satisfactorily completed. Missed aimpoint by 14,917 m.

Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 'On the Creation of pockets With Engines on the Basis of Nuclear Energy Applications--work on a draft project for rockets with nuclear engines' was issued. Competing engine designs were in development by Glushko's OKB-456 and Bondaryuk's OKB-670. Both designs used existing available reactors in cyldindrical housings, with the reactors operating at 3000 degrees K. The propellant was heated in the reactor and exhausted through four expansion nozzles. The Glushko engine operated with ammonia, while the Bondaryuk engine used a mixture of ammonia and alcohol. With such propellants a specific impulse of 430 seconds was achieved.

Space Technology Laboratories was requested to submit a proposal to perform system engineering and technical direction of the Air Force man in space program based on the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division's work statement. In event program authorization was received prior to completion of the proposal, work would begin under a letter contract. Pending receipt of such approval, the contractor's work on Man-In-SpaceSoonest program would be confined to technical staff assistance, a function it was performing as a technical requirement of the existing contract. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

General Electric Company personnel presented a briefing at NACA headquarters on studies related to manned space flight. The company held contracts let by the Wright Air Development Center for study and mock-up of a manned spacecraft. NACA made no official comment.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency addressed two questions to the research and development command: Would the Air Force accept a 110 nautical mile orbit instead of 150 nautical miles for the manned space flight? What degree of program accomplishment could be obtained with a fiscal 1959 program of $50 million based on an Atlas-117L second stage? (Chronological "Space Hi't, 1958.)

Mouse 'Mia II' reached 1600 km altitude, flew 9600 km range, but re-entry vehicle not recovered. The second Air Force Thor/Able reentry (nose cone) test vehicle, testing a GE ablation-type nose cone, was launched from Cape Canaveral on a 6,000-mile flight down the Atlantic Missile Range. This was the first U.S. reentry vehicle to make a full-range ICBM flight and reentry.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency favors the Convair-AVCO proposal to complete the Man-In-Space-Soonest Program. Air Force Ballistic Missile Division answered the two questions forwarded on 10 July. The division understood that the Advanced Research Projects Agency was disposed to favor the Convair-AVCO proposal to complete the Man-In-Space-Soonest Program. Under this assumption 150 nautical miles would be the minimum altitude for technical and economic reasons. Although the division would not choose to drop to a $50 million level for fiscal 1959, if it were directed to do so it could prepare the planning in time for a briefing to the commander of Air Research and Development Command by 15 August 1958. A manned orbital flight under such a program would not be possible until late in calendar year 1961 or early 196Z. The division requested that command headquarters issue confirming instructions and additional guidance. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

Cook Electric Company submitted a proposal to the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation as a part of a preliminary study and design effort by McDonnell for a manned satellite. McDonnell, prior to being awarded the Mercury prime development contract in February 1959, spent 11 months under a company research budget working on a manned orbital spacecraft concept.

Fired from AMR at 0404 hours EST to a pre-calculated range of 1,241.3 nm. The nose cone impacted 1.0 nm short and 1.5 nm to the right of the predicted impact point. This was the first flight test of the complete inertial guidance system. The nose cone recovery mission was successful. This was also the second successful flight test of a full scale tactical type nose cone, as well as a successful flight test of the Jupiter lightweight, high explosive warhead.

In a memorandum to Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director of NACA, pointed out that NASA would inherit from NACA a rich technical background, competence, and leadership in driving toward the objective of a manned satellite program. For years NACA groups had been involved in research on such items as stabilization of ultra-high speed vehicles, provision of suitable controls, high temperature structural designs, and all the problems of reentry. In fact, a part of this work had been directed specifically toward the problem of designing a manned satellite. Also, the X-15 program had provided much experience in human factors applicable to the orbital flight of man. Therefore, Dr. Dryden concluded, in consonance with the intent of the Space Act of 1958, the assignment of the program to the NACA would be consistent.

Headquarters USAF approved the Minuteman source selections of Thiokol Chemical, Aerojet-General, and Hercules Powder Company as the propulsion contractors for the solid-fuel motors of the missile. Avco Corporation was chosen as the reentry vehicle (nose cone) developer, and Autonetics Division of North American Aviation was selected as inertial guidance and control (G&C) system contractor.

The initial Atlas Series B missile flight test vehicle (3B) malfuncticr.ed and broke up 60 seconds after launch from the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral. To the basic Series A airframe, the Series B missiles added the complete North American Aviation MA-1 propulsion cluster of booster and sustainer engines, General Electric's Mod II airborne radio inertial guidance system (open loop), and GE's Mark II nose cone. First full-powered flight of USAF Atlas B ICBM using both the sustainer and booster engines. 'Marginally successful'.

In its second successful flight test, the Thor/Able (Number 1.19) advanced reentry test vehicle demonstrated proper reentry of the advanced General Electric ablative nose cone during a 5,300-mile test flight. Two successful tests established the two-stage Thor/Able as a reliable vehicle for further special test programs. This allowed the Air Force and other government agencies to complete plans for more advanced space programs. Mouse 'Wickie' not recovered; nose cone lost.

Major General B. A. Schriever, missile division commander, recommended slipping the target date for the first manned flight from April to May 1960 because of continued delay in approving MISS. Work statements had been initiated for all aspects of the program and the Air Fzrce was studying the Ground Based Information System (tracking and control network) "andthe heat sink versus ablation problem, while Convair, Aerojet-General and Lockheed were studying the design of the backup second stage. Source selection had been established to evaluate prospective contractors to submit proposals for a small capsule. Invitations to the request for proposals briefing would be dispatched within 24 hours after program approval and commitment of funds. Requests for proposals were also being prepared on system assembly tests and a large capsule design. To forestall further program slippage, Schriever made the following recommendations: immediate approval of Man-In-Space-Soonest at a level of $106.6 million for fiscal 1959; grant $31.92 million immediately for first quarter commitment; remainder of second quarter funds, $21.85 million, be released by 1 October and the third and fourth quarter funds of $52.89 million be available by 1 January 1959., Finally, the program should be assigned a priority commensurate with the urgency of the man in space mission. (Ltr, Schriever to Anderson, 24 Jul 58, subj: Actions Required for Man-In-Space-Soonest Program.)

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division published its sixth Manned Military Space System Development plan. This proposed a single Atlas booster, but with a back-up program for a second stage (either 117L or AJ 10), to place a man in a 150 nautical mile orbit in June 1960. The cost to carry out this plan was estimated at $106.66 million for fiscal 1959. (Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division representatives again presented a series of Washington briefings. These were to Lt General S. E. Anderson, Commander, Air Research and Development Command; the Air Staff; Secretary of the Air Force and Staff; and Director Roy Johnson, of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The latter presentation, in addition to reporting detailed man in space planning, requested prompt program approval and emphasized the urgency of firm funds commitment if further delay was to be avoided. Johnson's response to the briefing may be summarized as follows: (a) the man in space program would not be approved at this time; (b) it appeared that $50 million would be an optimistic estimate of man in space funding until the Space Council, authorized by recent legislation, was organized and working, an event that was not probable before Thanksgiving; (c) planning anything over a $50 million program, the maximum likely to be approved under any circumstances, was wasted effort; (d) statements of prominent scientists had convinced the White House there was no currently valid reason for Man-InSpace: (e) when the Space Council became a viable organization, man in space would probably become a joint effort of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; (f) The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (the National Aeronautics and Space Act creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was to become law on 29 July 1958) was already thinking of an independent but very similar space program that would cost about $40 million in fiscal 1959. After these two days of briefings it was clear that quick approval of a military man in space program was not forthcoming. (MFR, Col J. D. Lowe, Ch, Space Sys Div, AFBMD, 30 Jul 58, subj: MISS Briefing to Hq ARDC, Hq USAF, the Secretary of the Air Force and ARPA on 24-25 July 1958.)

Despite mounting evidence that the Air Force would not be assigned management of any national lunar program, it continued to press for a manned space program. On this date there was a meeting of Dr. Dryden, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; Mr. R. Johnson, Advanced Research Projects Agency; and Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy but future management of a manned space program was not resolved and it appeared that resolution would only bp attained at the Presidential level. It was assumed, however,that the Air Force would have at least $50 million in fiscal 1959 funds to further its space program. (MFR, Col J.D. Lowe, AFBMD, 29 Jul 58, subj: Man-In-Space Program, cited in Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

The President signed the law by which the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics would be succeeded by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The new agency would have custody of all space programs except those clearly oriented toward military objectives. Air Force headquarters obtained approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish within the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, a Directorate of Advanced Technology. Brigadier General H. A. Boushey was appointed director of the new office and its primary function, although the words "space" and "astronautics" were conspicuously absent from its mission description, was to serve as the control point for all Air Force space projects. (Bowen, The Threshold of Space, p. 21.)

By using the development model of the Mercury contour couch designed by Maxime A. Faget and associates, Carter C. Collins withstood a 20g load on the centrifuge at Johnsville, Pennsylvania. This test proved that the reentry accelerations of manned space flight could be withstood.

Obviously the military services no longer controlled development of space vehicles and programs. Through fiscal 1958 all space programs had been managed by the Department of Defense through the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The new fiscal year offered little hope for change and, on 29 July, the President ordered transfer to National Aeronautics and Space Administration of nonmilitary space programs such as lunar probes, scientific satellites, and the Vanguard project. (Bowen, The Threshold of Space, p. 28.)

Air Force headquarters forwarded the following instructions and request for information to the Air Research and Development Command:. the Man-InSpace Program was to be programmed at a fiscal 1959 level of $50 million. The 1evel of expenditures was to be scheduled so that acceleration would be possible on 1 December 1958 if additional funds were forthcoming or if they were not, the program could be funded in an orderly manner through the remainder of the year. The research and development command should also seek to answer the question: Why should the military furnish the first man in space ? (Msg, AFDAT 53918, Hq USAF to Cmdr ARDC, 30 Jul 58, cited in Chronological Space Hist, 1958.)

Republic Aviation representatives briefed NACA Headquarters personnel on the man-in-space studies in which the company had been engaged since the first of the year. They envisioned a four-stage solid launch vehicle system and a lifting reentry vehicle, which was termed a sled. The vehicle was to be of triangular shape with a 75 degree leading-edge sweep. Aerodynamic and reaction controls would be available to the pilot. For the launch vehicle, Republic proposed a Minuteman first stage, a Polaris first stage, a Minuteman upper stage, and a Jumbo rocket fourth stage. Other details relative to reentry and recovery were included in the briefing.

Khrushchev independently conceived of the idea of storing and launching ballistic missiles from subterranean silos. He called Korolev to his dacha in the Crimea. Korolev told him his idea was not feasible. He then called Barmin and Yangel. Barmin said he would study the idea. Yangel remained silent. Some time later Khrushchev's son saw a drawing of the same concept in a US aerospace magazine. He informed his father, who ordered immediate crash development of the first generation of Soviet missile silos.

Teak was a rocket-launched test of a live W-39 nuclear warhead. Purpose was to measure the effects of high altitude nuclear explosions in order to design warheads for the Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile system. The Hardtack Configuration Redstone shot the 3.8 megaton warhead to an altitude of 77.8 km. This was the first rocket-launched nuclear test by the United States.

The first successful flight test of a Series B Atlas missile. This was also the first successful staging of a long-range missile. (AF Ballistic Missiles Program Status Report.) Flight test missile 4B was the first Atlas Series B missile to be launched successfully and the first ICBM to complete staging. Its 2,500-mile powered flight was the first time that the MA-1 propulsion cluster operated for the planned duration of flight. Second full-powered flight of USAF Atlas ICBM traveled 2,500 miles with radio-inertial guidance, fully successful.

Headquarters USAF issued General Operational Requirement (GOR) 171 that established an Air Force requirement for an economical, quick-reaction, solid-propellant or storable liquids ICBM weapon system. Initial operational capability (IOC) was set as FY1963. The Minuteman (WS 133A) was intended to fulfill this requirement.

A memorandum from the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Defense recommended Project Adam for a manned space flight program. This plan proposed a ballistic suborbital flight using existing Redstone hardware as a national political-psychological demonstration. This memo proposed that funds in the amount of $9 million and $2.5 million for fiscal years 1959 and 1960, respectively, be approved for program execution.

T. Keith Glennan, President of Case Institute of Technology, and Hugh L. Dryden, Director of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, were nominated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to be Administrator and Deputy Administrator of NASA. The Senate confirmed their nominations one week later.

Orange was a rocket-launched test of the W-39 warhead. Purpose was to measure the effects of high altitude nuclear explosions in order to design warheads for Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile system. The Hardtack Configuration Redstone shot the 3.8 megaton warhead to an altitude of 43 km.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency ARPA provided the Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) with authority and initial funding to develop the Juno V (later named Saturn launch vehicle. ARPA Order 14 described the project: "Initiate a development program to provide a large space vehicle booster of approximately 1.5 million pounds of thrust based on a cluster of available rocket engines. The immediate goal of this program is to demonstrate a full-scale captive dynamic firing by the end of calendar year 1959." Within AOMC, the Juno V project was assigned to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Ala.

An Air Force Thor/Able It launch vehicle, carrying the first U.S. International Geophysical Year (IGY) lunar payload, exploded 77 seconds after liftoff from Cape Canaveral because of a first-stage engine failure. First US lunar attempt. The first US Air Force lunar probe, using a Thor-Able booster. An explosion ripped it apart 77 seconds after launch.

Planned August launch rescheduled after failure of American lunar probe on August 17. Inability to complete final tests of the new engines and malfunctions during pre-launch preparations indicated a lot of work had to be done on the new launch vehicle before the first launch could be attempted.

AVCO briefed Brigadier General H. A. Boushey, Director of Advanced Technology, Headquarters USAF. The company proposed--as it had on previous occasions -a metal drag brake system. The proposal appeared especially attractive to the Advanced Research Projects Agency staff and the Air Staff because of its apparent potential versatility in terms of military applications. The Air Research and Development Command was directed to proceed immediately with a technical evaluation of the proposal and the Defense Department seriously considered supporting a project which would test AVCO's concept., The ballistic missile division preferred the solution to the re-entry problem offered in the man in space technical plan-which appeared to be in the process of being absorbed by the civilian space agency; evidence of the plan's technical validity. Beyond these developments there was no change in the status of the military space program and the likelihood of the Advanced Research Projects Agency accepting even a scaled down fiscal 1959 appropriation of $40 million in support of the military space effort appeared, in the words of Johnson, "to be less than 50 50. ' (Msg RDZGW 8-25 -E, Hq ARDC, to AFBMD, 21 Aug 58.)

Ritland, AFBMD Vice Commander, reoriented the Division's reentry vehicle research and development program. Avco was directed to cancel its work on a y copper "heat sink" reentry vehicle. General Electric's Mark II copper "heat sink" nose con^ would be used on Thor IRBMs and early model Atlas ICBMs. Moreover, GE was assigned to start work on lightweight, second generation nose cones for heavier warheads.

Russian engineer cosmonaut 1985-2009. World record for total duration spent in space (803 days). Flew in space six times. First Russian to fly aboard an American spacecraft. 6 spaceflights, 803.4 days in space. Flew to orbit on Soyuz TM-7 (1988), Soyuz TM-12, STS-60, STS-88, Soyuz TM-31, Soyuz TMA-6.

The Argus series were the only clandestine nuclear tests ever conducted by the United States. The rocket-launched nuclear warheads were set off at very high altitudes over the South Atlantic, 1800 km south-west of Capetown, South Africa. The purpose was to determine the effects of nuclear explosions on the Earth's magnetic field and the impact to military radar, communications, satellites and ballistic missiles electronics. The earth's magnetic field is not only off-axis from the earth, but also off centre from the earth's core. This means the Van Allen Radiation belts are closest to the earth in the region known as the 'South Atlantic Anomaly'. This made the selected launch point the ideal place for launching a rocket into the lower belt where the particles and radiation from the explosion would be trapped.

The 1.7 kiloton W-25 warhead used had been developed and previously tested for the Genie air-to-air missile. The first test was launched from vessel AVM1 at 38.5 deg S, 11.5 deg. W, and exploded at an altitude of 160 km. The initial flash was followed by an auroral luminescence extending upward and downward along the magnetic lines where the burst occurred. The experiment verified the predicitons made in the original October 1957 proposal by N. C. Christofilos of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore.

Fired from AMR at 1815 hours EST. The countdown was normal. Operations were interrupted by one hold -- a 15 minute delay for minor adjustments. Ignition, main-stage, and lift-off were normal. The missile followed the pre-selected trajectory closely during powered flight, though cut-off was effected by fuel depletion rather than by pre-set guidance cut-off. The nose cone impacted 39 nm short and 15.7 nm to the left of the pre-calculated range of 1,246 nm. Jupiter 7 was the first flight test of the warhead and fuse system. This also marked the second flight test of the :Jupiter all-inertial guidance system, the fourth flight test of the NAA S-3D engine operating at 150,000 pounds thrust, and the first flight test of the solid propellant spin rocket and vernier motor.

ARPA issued order Number 19-59 establishing the Centaur program that would provide a high energy, liquid-fuel upper stage for use with either the Atlas or Titan boosters. Pratt and Whitney was to develop the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engines for the upper stage vehicle to be developed by Convair/Astronautics. The development goal was to produce an upper stage vehicle that could place a satellite into a 24-hour, synchronous orbit 23,000 miles above the equator.

The future of the proposed Air Force space program was uncertain due to the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It appeared probable that final over-all space program would be adopted until the large area of overlapping jurisdiction between the two agencies was sorted out. In addition, the Department of Defense was required to transfer some $117 million in fiscal 1959 funds to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of which $58.8 million was Air Force money. Thus it appeared that of the various proposed programs already within National Aeronautics and Space Administration's legitimate area of interest it might well take over the man in space program primarily because it had the money to undertake its development. In respect to the lunar probe program, the Air Force had to wait for further direction before proceeding further. The large booster (one million pound thrust) authorized for Air Force development was transferred to the civilian. space agency. The Air Force would continue development of the 117L system under the over-all direction of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. (Memo, Col C. R. Roderick, Committee Liaison Div, Ofc of Legislative Liaison, to Asst Dir, Legislative Liaison, Sep 58, no subj.)

The Transit and TIROS satellite programs were initiated with booster responsibilities assigned to AFBMD. Transit was a navigation satellite, while TIROS (Television Infrared Observation Satellite) was to take television pictures of cloud cover and transmit meteorological information for relay to ground stations.

Cruise stage tanks 1 and 4 empty. The boosters operated normally and the cruise stage ignited at Mach 2.95-3.0. At T+95 seconds there were problems at separation of the boosters, leading to cruise stage instability and an asymmetric airflow through the ramjet diffuser leading. This caused significant variations in thrust. The pressure in tank 3 dropped at T+160s econds and the ramjet flamed out.

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division published the seventh Manned Military Space System Development Plan. The word "Soonest" was conspicuously absent from the title. The plan contained no startling innovations but reduced the program to fit fiscal 1959 anticipated expenditures of $40 million with no second stage backup. The first manned flight was scheduled for December 1960. (Ltr, Brig Gen 0. J. Ritland, V/Cmdr, AFBMD, to Crndr, ARDC, 15 Sep 58, subj: Man-In-Space Program.)

North American had received funding to fly seven surplus G-26 missiles in a program dubbed RISE (Research Into Supersonic Environment), ostensibly to obtain real-world data on Mach 3 flight for the F-108 interceptor and B-70 bomber that they were developing for the USAF. On this first attempt, the booster performed well, but after separation the cruise stage fuel system failed, and ramjet ignition never occurred. The cruise stage impacted 150 km downrange.

The deputy commander organizational structure, under which the division carried out its development mission and support functions, was enlarged to four deputy commanders--one each for ballistic missiles, military space systems, installations, and resources. 3 (Hist, The Space Systems Division--Background (1957-1962), Feb 63, prep by SSD Hist Div.)

Three launches were made from Arensch, including two successful launches of the prototype of the large meteorological rocket developed by Ernst Mohr of Wuppertall. The launches were witnessed by Vice-President Ross. The redesigned Mohr rockets were 2.5 m long, 30 cm in diameter, had a total mass of 80 kg and produced 7.8 tonnes thrust. Cutoff velocity was 1200 m/s at 1200 m altitude. The payload dart then separated and coasted up to 50 km altitude. It was later planned to install meteorological instruments on these rockets.

A joint National Aeronautics and Space Administration/Advanced Research Projects Agency Manned Satellite Panel was formed. This panel, with the aid of technical studies prepared by the Langley and Lewis Research Centers and assistance from the military services, drafted specific plans for a program of research leading to manned space flight.

Following a Memorandum of Agreement between Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris of Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) and Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Director Roy W. Johnson on this date and a meeting on November 4, ARPA and AOMC representatives agreed to extend the Juno V project. The objective of ARPA Order 14 was changed from booster feasibility demonstration to "the development of a reliable high performance booster to serve as the first stage of a multistage carrier vehicle capable of performing advanced missions."

A series of meetings were held in Washington, with Robert R. Gilruth serving as chairman to draft a manned satellite program and provide a basic plan for meeting the objectives of this program. Others attending included S. B. Batdorf, A. J. Eggers, Maxime A. Faget, George Low, Warren North, Walter C. Williams, and Robert C. Youngquist.

The remaining X-10's were expended as targets for Bomarc and Nike antiaircraft missiles. The X-10 flew out over the ocean, then accelerated toward the Cape at supersonic speed. A Bomarc A missile came within lethal miss distance. The X-10 then autolanded on the Skid Strip, but both the drag chute and landing barrier failed. The vehicle ran off the runway and exploded.

Evaluation of life support Phase I contractor efforts at North American Aviation and General Electric was completed. The studies of both contractors were considered excellent. The contract winner, however, was not announced because the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was taking over the manned space program. The mockup of the manned capsule developed I by North American Aviation, together with associated technical data was, subsequently, delivered to the civilian agency's Space Task Group at Langley Re"-search Center., (Rpt, Comparison of NASA Manned Space Program and USAF Manned Military Space Proposal, 25 Feb 60, prep by AFBMD; Cmdrs Ref Book, 25 Mar 59.)

Drop tests of full-scale capsules from a C-130 airplane were started to check parachute deployment and spacecraft stability. Preliminary drops of the parachute system were made from a NASA helicopter at West Point, Virginia. These drops involved the use of a concrete-filled drum attached to an operating canister system. The purpose of this phase was to demonstrate the adequacy of the mechanical system of deploying the parachutes. Subsequently, the drops were made by the C-130's at Pope Field, North Carolina, from low levels to perfect a means of extracting the spacecraft from the aircraft. Full-scale spacecraft and operating parachutes were used in these drops, and all operational features of the drop-test program were worked out. The next phase was the research and development drops offshore of Wallops Island, Virginia, and the objectives here were as follows: to study the stability of the spacecraft during free fall and with parachute support; to study the shock input to the spacecraft by parachute deployment; and to study and develop retrieving operations.

Dr. W. Randolph Lovelace II was appointed by NASA Headquarters as Chairman of a Special Committee on Life Sciences by T. Keith Glennan, the NASA Administrator. After prospective astronaut candidates were interviewed in Washington, D. C., those chosen for further consideration received medical examinations at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was formally organized and began operation as the government agency in charge of the national civilian space program. NASA was activated in accordance with the terms of Public Law 85-568, and the nonmilitary space projects which had been conducted by the Advanced Research Projects Agency were transferred to the jurisdiction of the NASA. Concurrently, NACA, after a 43-year tenure, was inactivated, and its facilities and personnel became a part of NASA.

Studies and plans of the manned satellite project were presented to Advanced Research Projects Agency on October 3 and to Dr. T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator, on October 7. On October 7, 1958, Dr. Glennan approved the project by saying, in effect, 'Let's get on with it.'

Personnel from the Space Task Group involved in the study of reentry methods visited the Air Force Wright Air Development Center, Dayton, Ohio, for the purpose of preparing test specimens. Along with individuals from the center and the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, the group then met at the Chicago Midway Laboratories, Chicago, Illinois, to investigate various ablation methods of reentry. Concurrently, these same methods were being investigated at high-temperature test facilities at Langley.

NASA formally organized Project Mercury to: (1) place manned space capsule in orbital flight around the earth; (2) investigate man's reactions to and capabilities in this environment; and (3) recover capsule and pilot safely. A NASA Space Task Group organized at Langley Research Center drew up specifications for the Mercury capsule, based on studies by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics during the preceding 12 months, and on discussions with the Air Force which had been conducting related studies.

Fired from AMR at 2249 hours EST. The missile was destroyed after 49 seconds of erratic flight caused by fire in the tail section. The fire was believed to have started by a pin-hole leak near the thrust transducer which burned through the fuel and LOX transducer lines. This was the first Jupiter missile to use swivelled turbine exhaust for roll contral, also first use of solid vernier control.

PIONEER I, U.S.-IGY space probe under direction of NASA and with the AFBMD as executive agent, launched from AMR, Cape Canaveral, Fla., by a Thor-Able-I booster. It raveled 70,700 miles before returning to earth, determined radial extent of great radiation belt, first observations of earth's and interplanetary magnetic field, and first measurements of micrometeorite density in interplanetary space.

A bidders' briefing for the Little Joe launch vehicle was held. As earlier mentioned, this launch vehicle was to be used in the development phase of the manned satellite project. The Little Joe launch vehicle was 48 feet in height, weighed (at maximum) 41,330 pounds, was 6.66 feet in diameter, consisted of four Pollux and four Recruit clustered, solid-fuel rockets, could develop a thrust of 250,000 pounds, and could lift a maximum payload of 3,942 pounds.

The first of a series of meetings between the Space Task Group and Air Force Ballistic Missile Division was held to define support required by the civilian space agency. The scope of the manned space effort, its booster requirements, procurement procedures, launch schedules and facilities, were defined. The missile division also needed to define the extent of its own role in the. Mercury program. Control of booster procurement, scheduling use of scarce ground and launch facilities in the face of possible interference with ballistic missile development, and the desire to use the existing Air Force Ballistic Missile Division/ Space Technology Laboratories management structure in carrying out the support role were some of the questions and policies to be resolved. The first meeting was exploratory in nature; the missile division indicated its complete support of the Mercury program insofar as it did not interfere with the missile development effort; the space agency indicated its desire to procure boosters through, and use as much of Air Force Ballistic Missile Division's resources and capabilities as possible. (Rpt, AFBMD Support, Project Mercury, Dec 1960, prep by AFBMD Space Div (WDZ.)

NASA¾with the Army as executive agent¾attempted to launch a 12-foot-diameter inflatable satellite of micro-thin plastic covered with aluminum foil known as BEACON. Launched from AMR by a Juno I¾a modified Redstone, the payload prematurely separated prior to booster burnout.

The Stever Committee, which had been set up on January 12, submitted its report on the civilian space program to NASA. Among the recommendations:

• A vigorous, coordinated attack should be made upon the problems of maintaining the performance capabilities of man in the space environment as a prerequisite to sophisticated space exploration.
• Sustained support should be given to a comprehensive instrumentation development program, establishment of versatile dynamic flight simulators, and provision of a coordinated series of vehicles for testing components and subsystems.
• Serious study should be made of an equatorial launch capability.
• Lifting reentry vehicles should be developed.
• Both the clustered- and single-engine boosters of million-pound thrust should be developed.
• Research on high-energy propellant systems for launch vehicle upper stages should receive full support.
• The performance capabilities of various combinations of existing boosters and upper stages should be evaluated, and intensive development concentrated on those promising greatest usefulness in different categories of payload.

A special Committee on Life Sciences was established at Langley to determine qualifications and attributes required of personnel to be selected for America's first manned space flight and to give advice on other human aspects of the manned satellite program.

A second Space Task Group Air Force Ballistic Missile Division meeting, held at Langley Research Center, continued the task of developing a coordinated Project Mercury effort. The space agency offered a tentative launch and test program and the missile division assisted in preparing a development plan. Schedules, operating procedures, funding and general allocation of responsibilities were discussed but the meeting was not marked by any major agreements. (Rpt, AFBMD Support, Proj Mercury, Dec 1960 prep by AFBMD Space Div (WDZ.)