Status: Study 1961. Gross mass: 13,000 kg (28,000 lb). Span: 5.58 m (18.30 ft).
In September 1961 NASA's James Chamberlin came up with a plan to use a Gemini capsule to land two men on the moon and return them safely to earth at a cost 1/20 of that of the Apollo project. The key was the use of the technique of lunar orbit rendezvous and a bare-bones, open cockpit lunar module. This would weigh 4,372 kg in the storable propellant version or 3,284 kg in the cryogenic Lox/LH2 version (calculated propellant loads 3,500 kg and 2,200 kg, respectively). The total mass to be injected into an escape trajectory toward the moon would be no more than 13,000 kg, one fifth of the 68,000 kg planned for the Nova-boosted direct-lunar landing approach favored at that time. At this mass, instead of Nova, a Saturn C-3 launch vehicle could be used. The Gemini flight schedule would have been delayed by a year in order to develop a more capable spacecraft. However by launching every 45 days instead of every 60 days Gemini would still put an American on the moon by January 1966:
Date | Flight | Description |
Titan 2 Launches |
Mar 1964 | Gemini 1 | Unmanned orbital |
May 1964 | Gemini 2 | Manned orbital |
Jun 1964 | Gemini 3 | 7-day manned orbital |
Aug 1964 | Gemini 4 | 14-day manned orbital |
Sep 1964 | Gemini 5 | Agena docking |
Nov 1964 | Gemini 6 | Agena docking |
Dec 1964 | Gemini 7 | Agena docking |
Feb 1965 | Gemini 8 | Centaur docking, boost to high Earth orbit |
Mar 1965 | Gemini 9 | Centaur docking, boost to high Earth orbit |
May 1965 | Gemini 10 | LM docking |
Jun 1965 | Gemini 11 | LM docking |
Jul 1965 | Gemini 12 | LM docking |
Sep 1965 | Gemini 13 | Centaur docking, boost to Lunar flyby |
Oct 1965 | Gemini 14 | Centaur docking, boost to Lunar flyby |
|
Saturn C-3 Launches | |
Nov 1965 | Gemini 15 | Manned Lunar orbital |
Jan 1966 | Gemini 16 | Manned Lunar landing |
The lunar module would have been launched separately by Titan II for the three Earth orbital docking missions. This moon landing project was projected to cost $ 584 million 'plus the cost of two Saturn C-3's'.
Chamberlin was actually the first member of the Space Task Group (STG) to advocate lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) as a method for reaching the moon. Earlier efforts through 1960 and 1961 by John Houbolt and other engineers at Langley to interest STG in the method had been seen as the impractical musings of theorists. Chamberlin and McDonnell Aircraft did not fall in this category. They saw clearly that separating the re-entry and lunar landing functions allowed optimized spacecraft designs for each role, and solved many of the intractable engineering problems the direct-ascent advocates were struggling with.
Chamberlin made one last effort at the end of September to interest STG in including lunar Gemini as part of an "Integrated Apollo Program". This involved the same flight schedule as advocated earlier, but with the cost estimate now firmed up at $ 706 million (including the Saturn boosters!), and the lunar module mass cut to 1,800 kg. NASA brass still rejected the lunar aspects of the plan, but told STG to go ahead with negotiations with McDonnell, Martin, and Lockheed for the spacecraft and boosters. Chamberlin submitted the revised plan without lunar flights on October 27, and this was approved as the basis for project Gemini.
The actual Gemini project as flown was over a year late to the original optimistic plan. This was due to delays in development of both the Titan 2 launch vehicle and the Gemini paraglider landing system. The pivotal 14-day flight actually came in December 1965 versus January 1964 in the first Mercury Mark II proposal and August 1964 in the September 1961 plan.
Date | Flight | Description | |
Apr 1964 | Gemini 1 | Unmanned booster orbital test; boilerplate spacecraft. | |
Jan 1965 | Gemini 2 | Unmanned suborbital test of spacecraft | |
Mar 1965 | Gemini 3 | Manned orbital | |
Jun 1965 | Gemini 4 | 4-day manned orbital | |
Aug 1965 | Gemini 5 | 8-day manned orbital | |
Dec 1965 | Gemini 7 | 14-day manned orbital | |
Dec 1965 | Gemini 6 | Rendezvous with Gemini 7 (Agena target failed to orbit) | |
Mar 1966 | Gemini 8 | Agena docking | |
Jun 1966 | Gemini 9 | Agena docking | |
Jul 1966 | Gemini 10 | Agena docking | |
Sep 1966 | Gemini 11 | Agena docking | |
Nov 1966 | Gemini 12 | Agena docking |
It was possible to estimate when Chamberlain's Gemini moon landing would have actually occurred based on the actual delays to Gemini. It must be considered that the time necessary to develop the Saturn C-3 could not have been much less than that actually taken for the C-5 (the final December 1961 C-3B configuration differed from the C-5 only in the propellant loading in each stage and in having three F-1 engines in the first stage as opposed to five in the C-5). Therefore, with perfect hindsight, if Gemini had been selected in lieu of Apollo, the actual final program would have looked about like this:
Date | Flight | Description | |
Titan 2 Launches | |||
Apr 1964 | Gemini 1 | Unmanned booster orbital test; boilerplate spacecraft. | |
Jan 1965 | Gemini 2 | Unmanned suborbital test of spacecraft | |
Mar 1965 | Gemini 3 | Manned orbital | |
Jun 1965 | Gemini 4 | 4-day manned orbital | |
Aug 1965 | Gemini 5 | 8-day manned orbital | |
Dec 1965 | Gemini 7 | 14-day manned orbital | |
Dec 1965 | Gemini 6 | Rendezvous with Gemini 7 (Agena target failed to orbit) | |
Mar 1966 | Gemini 8 | Agena docking | |
Jun 1966 | Gemini 9 | Agena docking | |
Aug 1966 | Gemini 10 | Centaur docking, boost to high Earth orbit | |
Oct 1966 | Gemini 11 | Centaur docking, boost to high Earth orbit | |
Nov 1966 | Gemini 12 | LM docking | |
Jan 1967 | Gemini 13 | LM docking | |
Feb 1967 | Gemini 14 | LM docking | |
Mar 1967 | Gemini 15 | Centaur docking, boost to Lunar flyby | |
Apr 1967 | Gemini 16 | Centaur docking, boost to Lunar flyby | |
Saturn C-3 Launches | |||
Aug 1967 | Gemini 17 | Unmanned test of Saturn C-3 | |
Feb 1968 | Gemini 18 | Unmanned Lunar orbital test | |
Oct 1968 | Gemini 19 | Manned Lunar orbital | |
Dec 1968 | Gemini 20 | Manned Lunar landing |
So in the end, the first lunar landing would have been moved up by six months at best. There would have been a cost savings, but again analysis of the detailed cost breakdowns for Apollo indicate the savings would have been on the order of 'only' $ 4 billion out of the NASA $ 18 billion project share. So in retrospect it would seem that NASA's management was correct, for the Apollo missions flown were much more capable than a Gemini-based approach would have been.
Crew Size: 2. Habitable Volume: 2.55 m3.
Gemini-Centaur-LM Gemini for lunar landing with Centaur and Langley open cockpit Lunar Module Credit: © Mark Wade |
Albert C. Hall of The Martin Company proposed to Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA's Associate Administrator, that the Titan II be considered as a launch vehicle in the lunar landing program. Although skeptical, Seamans arranged for a more formal presentation the next day. Abe Silverstein, NASA's Director of Space Flight Programs, was sufficiently impressed to ask Director Robert R. Gilruth and STG to study the possible uses of Titan II. Silverstein shortly informed Seamans of the possibility of using the Titan II to launch a scaled-up Mercury spacecraft.
James A. Chamberlin and James T. Rose of STG proposed adapting the improved Mercury spacecraft to a 35,000-pound payload, including a 5,000-pound "lunar lander." This payload would be launched by a Saturn C-3 in the lunar orbit rendezvous mode. The proposal was in direct competition with the Apollo proposals that favored direct landing on the moon and involved a 150,000-pound payload launched by a Nova-class vehicle with approximately 12 million pounds of thrust.
John C. Houbolt of Langley Research Center made a presentation to STG on rendezvous and the lunar orbit rendezvous plan. At this time James A. Chamberlin of STG requested copies of all of Houbolt's material because of the pertinence of this work to the Mercury Mark II program and other programs then under consideration.
D. Brainerd Holmes, NASA Director of Manned Space Flight, outlined the preliminary project development plan for the Mercury Mark II program in a memorandum to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr. The primary objective of the program was to develop rendezvous techniques; important secondary objectives were long-duration flights, controlled land recovery, and astronaut training. The development of rendezvous capability, Holmes stated, was essential: