8K66 Credit - © Mark Wade

Two stage light ICBM developed 1960-1962, but cancelled so that Yangel could concentrate his efforts on the R-36. After project cancellation, a mock-up of this missile was shown in Moscow parades and misidentified for years by Western analysts as the 'SS-8'.

Development of the R-26 was begun by Yangel in accordance with a decree of 23 May 1960. This called for development of a silo-launched ICBM that could be stored for years as a sealed 'certified round' and then launched in minutes. The original decree optimistically called for flight trials to begin in December 1961, but by February 1962 the actual project had only reached the point of testing of an electrical mock-up of the missile. However by then Yangel's organisation was wholly occupied with getting the R-16 into service after the disastrous explosion of 24 October 1961. In April 1962 a decree was issued for Yangel to begin development of the R-36 heavy ICBM, and the leadership felt that all of his organisation's effort should be devoted to that project. Accordingly on 9 July 1962 all further work on the R-26 was stopped. LC-41A, which had been prepared for flight tests of the rocket, was converted to use as an alternate R-16 pad.

As a cancelled project the artefacts of the rather advanced development programme proved useful. A mock-up of this missile was shown in a Moscow parade on 7 November 1964 and misidentified for years by Western analysts as the 'SS-8 Sasin' (which was actually Korolev's R-9). A sectioned version of the missile was put on display at Orevo for instructional purposes. Models were displayed at the museum in Baikonur, but no completed flight-test missiles had been delivered there yet at the time of cancellation..

Manufacturer: Yuzhnoye. Liftoff Thrust: 1,175.100 kN (264,173 lbf). Total Mass: 85,500 kg (188,400 lb). Core Diameter: 2.75 m (9.02 ft). Total Length: 23.73 m (77.85 ft). Standard warhead mass: 1,500 kg (3,300 lb). Maximum range: 12,000 km (7,000 mi). Number Standard Warheads: 1. Standard warhead yield: 3,000 KT. Standard warhead CEP: 2.00 km (1.20 mi). Boost Propulsion: Nitric acid/UDMH. Boost engine: RD-224. Cruise Propulsion: Nitric acid/UDMH. Cruise engine: U102-000. Guidance: Inertial.

• Stage Number: 1. 1 x Stage: R-26 Stage 1. Gross Mass: 60,300 kg (132,900 lb). Empty Mass: 3,000 kg (6,600 lb). Thrust (vac): 1,451.000 kN (326,197 lbf). Isp: 310 sec. Burn time: 160 sec. Isp(sl): 251 sec. Diameter: 3.00 m (9.80 ft). Span: 15.00 m (49.00 ft). Propellants: Nitric acid/UDMH. No Engines: 1. Engine: RD-224. Other designations: 8K66. Status: Out of production. Orevo has sectioned hardware. Tsniimash has 1:10 structural simulation model. All figures accurate except empty mass estimated. Source: Placard, TsNIIMASH, Orevo.

• Stage Number: 2. 1 x Stage: R-26 Stage 2. Gross Mass: 25,200 kg (55,500 lb). Empty Mass: 2,500 kg (5,500 lb). Thrust (vac): 428.060 kN (96,232 lbf). Isp: 308 sec. Burn time: 160 sec. Isp(sl): 252 sec. Diameter: 2.40 m (7.80 ft). Span: 8.73 m (28.64 ft). Propellants: Nitric acid/UDMH. No Engines: 1. Engine: U102-000. Other designations: 8K66. Status: Out of production. Orevo has sectioned hardware. Tsniimash has 1:10 structural simulation model. All figures accurate except empty mass estimated. Source: Placard, TsNIIMASH, Orevo.

February 1963 - Launch Vehicle: UR-100, R-26.

• Council of Fili Nation: USSR. The Soviet leadership reviewed missile development since the Pitsunda meeting. Both the Yangel R-26 and Chelomei UR-100 were proposed as small ICBM’s to be put into mass production as a counter to the American Minuteman. The UR-100 was an ampulised missile with a guaranteed ten-year storage life. Yangel had not solved the problems of long-term storage of corrosive storable fuel yet. Therefore Khrushchev, supported by Kozlov and Brezhnev, selected the UR-100. A decree for mass production was issued on 30 May 1963.

• Khrushchev visits Baikonur Nation: USSR. Spacecraft: Voskhod, Berkut, LK-700. Flight: Voskhod 2. This was his last visit, just weeks before his overthrow. The Soviet leadership were shown the UR-100 and observed launches of the competing UR-200 and R-36. Khrushchev agreed with the decision to put the R-36 into production instead of Chelomei’s UR-200. He felt he couldn’t turn down Yangel a third time after approving Korolev’s N1 instead of Yangel’s R-56 and Chelomei’s UR-100 instead of Yangel’s R-26. Khrushchev decided to cancel Korolev’s badly behind schedule R-9A, even though Smirnov and Ustinov insisted they wanted it in their arsenal (in May 1965, after Khrushchev’s overthrow, this decision was reversed and the R-9A went into production).

  Khrushchev also visited a secret space fair, with Korolev, Chelomei, Yangel, and Glushko presenting their rockets and spacecraft. Chelomei presented his UR-700 heavy lift design as an alternative to Korolev’s N1. This presentation was a surprise to Ustinov and Dementiev. Khrushchev ordered Chelomei to prepare a draft proposal for the design. Chelomei hoped that 12 to 18 months later, when the UR-700 draft project would be completed, the fallacy of Korolev’s N1 design would be apparent to all. Korolev’s N1 plans were also reviewed and approved at the meeting.

  Over the two days, Khruschev witnessed five launches of rockets by Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei, all of them successful. Gagarin and Belyayev explained the Vykhod spacecraft to him, and Leonov donned a spacesuit and demonstrated how he would exit into open space form the inflatable airlock and return thereafter. All went very well.

  This was the last time Khrushchev saw the chief designers of the Soviet rocket industry. Despite his support for them not one of them visited him in his retirement.References: 376.

• Semenov, Yu. P., S P Korolev Space Corporation Energia, RKK Energia, 1994. ISBN: 1896522815. Dual English/Russian language picture book of the history of the Energia Corporation. Many unique photos and drawings of Korolev's rockets and spacecraft. Republished by Apogee books in 2000. More at amazon.com...

• Placard, TsNIIMASH Museum, .

• Pervov, Mikhail, Raketnoye Oruzhiye RVSN, Violanta, Moscow, 1999.. Narrative overview of the missiles of the Russian strategic missile forces.

• Karpenko, A V, Utkin, A F and Popov,A D, Otechestvenniye strategischeskiye raketnoye kompleks, Sankt-Peterburg: Nevskii bastion; Gangut 1999.. Well-illustrated encyclopedia of the missiles of the Russian strategic missile forces.