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More Details for 1967-12-11

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NASA Hq. asked further MSFC studies of one of the most critical phases during an Apollo mission, the period between holddown arm release and launch umbilical tower clearance.

Failures or incompatibilities that could cause a vehicle collision with ground equipment or a pad fallback were major elements of potential danger. Problems during that phase would be difficult to cope with from a crew safety or an abort point of view and also posed the double jeopardy possibility of losing both the space vehicle and mobile launcher.

A number of studies had been made at MSFC of certain aspects of the problem, particularly postliftoff flight dynamics, the effects of winds, etc. Those studies had brought out the catastrophic potential of near- pad engine-out and actuator-hardover failures. NASA Hq. now asked MSFC to investigate further, with assistance of other Centers as required, the inadvertent system operation and component failures that could affect

- a first-stage cutoff between holddown arm release and time of separation of the last physical connection between the vehicle and ground complex;

- inadvertent critical operation or inhibition of such space vehicle systems as the emergency detection subsystem, guidance and control, electrical, and range safety during the same critical period; and

- a premature or out-of-sequence liftoff.

The MSFC task leaders were asked to report findings to a panel made up of the MSFC, MSC, and KSC Apollo Program Managers and NASA Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips before the flight readiness reviews for Apollo 5 and 6, scheduled for January 3 and mid-January 1968.