Von Braun

Personal: Male. Born in Wiersitz, Germany.

Wernher von Braun was the leader of what has been called the "rocket team," which had developed the German V-2 ballistic missile in World War II. Attended institutes of technology in Berlin and Zurich and received doctorate in physics at the University of Berlin in 1934. Joined the rocket experimental center in Peenemunde in 1937 and was director of research until 1945; his work and that of his colleagues led to development of the V-1 and V-2 guided missiles used against the Allies during World War II. Surrendered to U.S. Army in 1945. Von Braun and some of his chief assistants--as part of a military operation called Project Paperclip--came to America and were installed at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, to work on rocket development and use the V-2 for high altitude research. They used launch facilities at the nearby White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. Later, in 1950 von Braun's team moved to the Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Alabama, to concentrate on the development of a new missile for the Army. They built the Army's Jupiter ballistic missile, and before that the Redstone, used by NASA to launch the first Mercury capsules.

After being moved to NASA, von Braun led his rocket team in the development - within only six years - of the monster Saturn I and Saturn V boosters, that took America to the moon. Von Braun's long standing dream of moving on to his personal life ojective - Mars - was crushed by the Nixon administration and a public grown jaded and indifferent to spaceflight. Von Braun died at Alexandria, Virginia just five years after leaving NASA after being sidelined into a headquarters job.

23 March 1912 - Wernher von Braun born in in Wirsitz, Posen.. Von Braun was the second of three sons born to Baron Magnus von Braun and Baroness Emmy von Quistorp.

Von Braun at Kummers

With the V-2 development program already in crisis, the Allies launch a massive bombing raid against Peenemuende. On that evening test pilot Hanna Reitsch was visiting the launch site. At 23:30 the air raid siren sounded. 600 British bombers drop 1500 tonnes of ordnance on the launch centre. However many bombs fell in the ocean around the peninsula, or buried themselves harmlessly in sand dunes. The resident area was hardest hit, while the Luftwaffe station at Peenemuende West was not touched. 47 British bombers were shot down - they were told before the raid that this was the most important mission of the war, and that their commanders would accept a 50% loss rate. 735 people were killed in the raid on the ground, including 178 of the 4000 inhabitants of the residential area. A large number of the foreign slave workers in the Trassenheide concentration camp barracks were also killed.

After the tremendous raid the rocket team wander around the devastated facility, half-clothed, the buildings bathed in a weird light and everything covered in fine sand, as if flour was dropped over everything. Thiel and Walther - the two leading rocket engineers in Germany - were killed in the raid, and virtually all major facilities were damaged. The saving grace was that the soft sand of Peenemuende attenuated the blast of many bombs. Nine bombs hit the main assembly hall, but while there was splinter damage to some of the machine tools, there was no decisive hit that would prevent production from continuing. It was estimated that operations could resume in 4 to 6 weeks.

The raid was not unexpected. The high altitude contrails of the V-2 test launches were called 'frozen lightning' and could be seen from Sweden on clear days. The location and purpose of Peenemuende appeared in a crossword puzzle in a illustrated magazine published in central Germany in early 1943. British reconnaissance flights to locate the launch facilities had been recognised for what they were.

This raid, together with the bombing of V-2 production lines at the Zeppelinwerke in Friedrichshafen and the Raxwerke in Wiener Neustadt convinced Saur to reduce the V-2 production rate goal to 900 per month.

Additional Details: Project Horizon Phase I report.

Additional Details: Lunar mission studies under way at the Army.

Additional Details: Engineering and cost study for a new Saturn configuration.

C-1:

S-I stage eight H-1 engines, 1.5 million pounds of thrust; S-IV stage four (LR-119 engines, 70,000 pounds of thrust); and S-V stage (two LR-119 engines, 35,000 pounds of thrust).

C-2 (four-stage version):

S-1 stage (same as first stage of the C-1); S-II (not determined); S-IV (same as second stage of the C-1); S-V (same as third Stage of C- 1).

C-2 (three-stage version):

S-I (same as first stage of C-1); S-II (not determined); and S-IV (same as third stage of C-1).

• Elimination of third-stage development, since two stages could put more than ten tons into earth orbit.
• Use of six LR-115 (15,000-pound) Centaur engines (second-stage thrust thus increased from 70,000 to 90,000 pounds).
• Redesign of the first stage (S-1) to offer more safety for manned missions.

• Begin Nova systems integration studies and develop the general arrangement of second and third stages. The studies should include spacecraft propulsion stages and spacecraft.
• Begin Saturn C-3 systems integration studies.
• Begin developing Nova and C-3 first-stage specifications in preparation to letting contracts
• Continue Launch Operations Directorate-Air Force Missile Test Center studies of Nova and C-3 launch sites at Atlantic Missile Range (AMR).
• Take steps to bring the contractor aboard as soon as possible for Nova and C-3 launch facility and test stand designs.
• Accelerate F-1 engine funding to provide adequate production engines for the Nova and C-3.
• Examine the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) proposal for static test facilities for large vehicle stages with a view toward beginning detailed site examination.
• Accelerate funding of the J-2 engine to provide acceptance test stands.
• Determine the necessity for a one-million-pound-thrust liquid- hydrogen - liquid-oxygen engine.
• Begin design studies on spacecraft propulsion systems and develop specifications. Define management responsibilities.
• Begin preparations for letting the contract for a spacecraft operations facility at AMR.
• Determine the relationships and responsibilities of MSFC and STG on guidance and control.

C-1:

Stages S-I (1.5 million pounds of thrust) and S-IV

C-2:

Stages S-I, S-II, and S-IV

C-3:

Stages S-IB (3 million pounds of thrust), S-II, and S-IV.

• Management of the SFC-STG Apollo-Saturn program.
• Resolution of all space vehicle problems, such as design systems, research and development tests, planning, schedules, and operations.
• Approval of mission objectives.
• Direction of the respective organizational elements in the conduct of the MSFC-STG Apollo-Saturn program, including approval of the Sub- Board and of the Coordination Panels.
• Formation of the Advanced Program Coordination Board consisting of top personnel from MSFC and STG. This Board would consider policy and program guidelines.

The Sub-Board would :

• Resolve space-vehicle coordination and integration problems and assign these to the Coordination Panels, if required.
• Prepare briefs in problem areas not resolved by the Board or Sub- Board.
• Act as a technical advisory group to the Board.
• Channel the decisions of the Board through the respective organizational elements of MSFC or STG for proper action.
• Ensure that the Saturn-Apollo Coordination Panels were working adequately and within the scope of their charters.
• Recommend to the Board modifications of the Panels.
• Define or resolve systems or integration problems of the Saturn launch vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft.
• Define mission objectives of the Saturn-Apollo space vehicle.
• Analyze and report progress of the Saturn-Apollo space vehicle.
• Initiate and guide studies for the selection of optimum Saturn- Apollo space vehicle systems.
• Define and establish reliability criteria.
• Establish and document flight safety philosophy.

Four Saturn-Apollo Coordination Panels were established to make available the technical competence of MSFC and STG for the solution of interrelated problems of the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. The four included the Launch Operations, Mechanical Design, Electrical and Electronics Design, and Flight Mechanics, Dynamics, and Control Coordination Panels. Although these Panels were designated as new Panels, the members selected by STG and MSFC represented key technical personnel who had been included in the Mercury-Redstone Panels, the Mercury-Atlas Program Panels, the Apollo Technical Liaison Groups, and the Saturn working groups. The Charter was signed by von Braun and Gilruth. Charter of the MSFC-STG Space Vehicle Board, October 3, 1961.

• The Saturn C-5 launch vehicle and earth orbital rendezvous were considered the primary mode for the lunar landing.
• Full-scale orbit operations development, including ground testing, would be accomplished, using S-I boosters and orbital upper stages. This development would be planned so that upper stages and rendezvous techniques would be developed by the time the C-5 was operational. Planning would consider both connecting and fueling modes.
• The development of a two-stage Nova with liquid-propellant engines in both stages would be activated as early as realistically feasible. This would provide an alternative, direct flight mode carrying the same orbital launch vehicle as developed for the C-5.
• There would be no solid-propellant vehicle development.

• Lunar orbit rendezvous, using the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle, should be the mission mode for lunar exploration.
• The development of a lunar logistics vehicle, using the Saturn C-1B or the C-5 launch vehicle, should be started and a six-month study of this development should begin immediately.
• Time was too short and the expense too great to develop a parallel backup mode.
• Study of the Nova vehicle should continue with the expectation that its development would follow the C-5 by two or three years.
• The C-1B launch vehicle should be started immediately, looking toward the first two-stage flight in mid- 1965.
• Development of a lunar excursion module should begin at once.

Additional Details: Extension of Apollo systems to permit more extensive exploration of the lunar surface..

Additional Details: Apollo mapping and survey system (M&SS).

Briefly MSFC proposed to transfer to MSC:

1. planning for Apollo Applications lunar traverses;
2. lunar surface geological, geophysical, geochemical, biological, and biomedical experiments; and
3. emplaced scientific station experiments.

1. the local scientific survey module and related mobility efforts,
2. Apollo Applications program lunar drill,
3. lunar surveying system, and
4. lunar flying device (one man flying machine).

Von Braun said that Ernst Stuhlinger of the Research Projects Laboratory had discussed the proposed actions for transfer of functions to MSC, and MSC Experiments Program Manager Robert O. Piland had indicated his general agreement, pending further consideration. He asked that Gilruth give his reaction to the proposal and said, "It would be very helpful if our two Centers could present a proposal to George Mueller (OMSF) on which we both agree."

Additional Details: John Bailey Chairman of ad hoc Apollo Safety Group.

Additional Details: George Low promotes idea of flying Apollo 8 as a lunar orbit mission without the Lunar Module.

Additional Details: Senior Apollo porject management backs Apollo 8 lunar mission concept.

Additional Details: During a key meeting of Apollo senior figures - top NASA management first approached regarding an Apollo 8 lunar mission in December - reaction: negative..

Young scientists from an academic environment found changing from a research scientist to a science administrator difficult; they often preferred active research to desk-and-meetings career.

Many scientists were reluctant to accept the long times between conceptual design and data gathering in space experiments - often 6 to 10 years. The question was not only of patience, graduate student support, and funding continuity, but also of scientific obsolescence.

Scientists felt that science was not as well represented in upper NASA management as were engineering and project management and that high-level decisions were often made without consideration of scientific viewpoints. While recognizing that the space program also had other prime objectives - such as advancement of technology, national achievement, applications, earth resources, and "bringing the world closer together" - they felt that "science is still a stepchild in this family of program objectives."

The analysis said that a good portion of the problems could be relieved by actions taken by Centers and NASA Hq. over the next few months and years. NASA space projects should be structured to give more scientists an opportunity to launch experiments. With the few present scientific flights, only a few scientists could hope to have their experiments flown in their lifetimes. The situation would improve when the Space Shuttle and Space Station were available, but that would not be before 1978 or 1979. With low emphasis on OAO, HEAO, Pioneer, ATM, and planetary flights suggested by the President's Space Task Group, "we will have almost no good flight experiments prepared, and almost no scientists left in the program, by the time the gates of the shuttle and the station open for science."

NASA should also find ways to reduce the time span between conception and flight of an experiment. "For Bill Kraushaar, who proposed a measurement of gamma rays with a simple (now almost obsolete) sensor on a Saturn launch vehicle, this time is now 8 years, with no end in sight." For the Apollo telescope mount principal investigators, "this time will be 8 years, provided that ATM-A is launched early in 1972."

The Shuttle promised great improvements, but "initiation or continuation of unmanned, relatively unsophisticated spacecraft projects for science payloads" was "highly desirable."

Procedures for proposal, screening, selection, acceptance, and final approval of experiments were "exceedingly cumbersome and time consuming." Streamlining requirements after approval - early definition, documentation, reporting, reviews, and administrative actions - as well as the maze of committees, boards, panels, and offices, was urgently recommended.

"Many scientists inside and outside NASA have suggested that NASA should establish, at a high level in the Administrator's Office, a 'Chief Scientist' position with no other functions than to act as a spokesman for . . . scientists who wish to participate in the space program."