In 1965 Korolev finally had his N1/L3 moon landing project, but it galled him that his rival, Chelomei, was forging ahead with a completely separate Proton/LK-1 manned circumlunar project. At that time it looked like the Americans would start Apollo flights by 1966, and possibly accomplish a manned lunar orbit mission by 1967. Chelomei's new Proton booster had passed its first tests, but development of his LK-1 manned spacecraft was lagging, especially the development of the re-entry capsule. Korolev had in hand his Soyuz spacecraft, due to start flight test in a few months, The Soyuz re-entry capsule had been designed from the beginning for re-entry from lunar distances. Korolev also had the Block D lunar crasher stage in development for the N1/L3. This was a restartable, liquid oxygen/kerosene stage that was based on both the existing Molniya-L upper stage and several years of design and development work on the cancelled Soyuz B circumlunar stage.
It occurred to Korolev that he could use Chelomei's Proton booster to launch a Block D + Soyuz combination in low earth orbit, then have the Block D rocket the Soyuz toward the moon. From the standpoint of the Soviet state, this would give them a good chance to beat the Americans around the moon, and eliminate duplication in manned spacecraft development. From the standpoint of Korolev, it would allow the re-entry capsule, Block D stage, and translunar navigation, guidance, and communications systems to be tested in advance of the first N1/L3 flights. From a purely personal standpoint, it would allow Korolev to get back at the hated Chelomei and allow him to take control of the entire manned civilian space program.
The devil, as they say, was in the details. At that time Chelomei's UR-500K booster (later dubbed Proton) had a payload mass of 18.5 tonnes into a low-earth orbit. Using a Block D with less-than-full tanks, this would allow a 5 tonne Soyuz to be launched toward the moon. The problem was this was just not in the cards. The Soyuz was in an advanced stage of development, and the total weight was 6.6 tonnes. For the translunar mission the rendezvous and docking electronics and orbital module could be deleted, but this would still leave the spacecraft at 5.5 tonnes. And the lunar version would require extra mass for thicker heat shielding (at least 300 kg, based on US figures), plus the circumlunar navigation electronics.
Korolev had already got himself deep in trouble with the N1/L3. He had sold the moon-landing project to the leadership as requiring only a single N1 launch when he knew the numbers didn't add up. There was no way to build the lunar orbiter and lunar lander spacecraft within any likely payload the N1 could deliver. Korolev wanted the N1 to be built at any cost - it had been stalled for four years, and the Americans were forging ahead with their Saturn V. He probably had confidence in his abilities to work the problems out in development. Failing that, he probably planned to sell the leadership on a two-launch scenario once he had his booster and spacecraft in hand. Perhaps he felt his mortality, that he had to get something going before he died, before it was too late. In any case, he had been in the Siberian gulag in the death camps of Kolyma -- what else could the regime punish him with if he failed?
It seems almost inexplicable that Korolev had put himself in the same bind regarding payload for the L1 program, but there it was. There were three solutions to the L1 weight problem:
The safest solution was not approved, and the both of the alternate 'direct flight' and 'podsadka' variants became the program baseline. The initial estimate, depending on performance parameters of the Proton launch vehicle and Block D stage, were that the L1 spacecraft would have a mass of 5,200 to 5,700 kg when it entered low earth orbit. After entering earth orbit, but before translunar injection, unneeded equipment (for the SAS abort system or podsadka mission) could be jettisoned prior to trans-earth injection. This would leave a spacecraft mass sent towards the moon of 5,000 to 5,550 kg.
The Cold Equations
The marginal nature of the L1 calculations meant that every kilogram aboard the spacecraft had to be fought over. The spacecraft had to carry additional payload in terms of a thicker heat shield and star sensors and a digital computer for navigation. To save weight in the SA re-entry vehicle, amazingly, the reserve parachute in the re-entry capsule had to be deleted, saving 200 kg. The load of hydrogen peroxide in the orientation thrusters was cut from 40 kg in the standard Soyuz to 30 kg, even though one would expect even more propellant to be used in a lunar return re-entry. In the PAO service module, the hydrogen peroxide thrusters and propellant used for the translation system (required only for docking operations) was deleted. The main propulsion system (consisting of a main engine and two independent back-up engines in Soyuz) was replaced by a lighter single-engine system. The propellant load was cut from 500 kg to 400 kg. Still, with all of the these drastic changes, the L1 could only barely be got under the 5700 kg maximum low earth orbit payload:
|Item||Soyuz 7K-OK||Delta to L1||L1|
|BO Living Module||1,100||-1,100||0|
|KOS Conical Section||0||180||180|
|SA Re-entry Capsule||2,810||90||2,900|
|PAO Service Module||2,650||-50||2,600|
|H2O2 Translation Propellant/Thrusters||250||-250||0|
|Main Engine Propellant||500||-100||400|
|Total in Low Earth Orbit||6,560||-1,060||5,680|
There was no margin here whatsoever. Even late in the program, the use of 6 kg personal parachutes to give the crew some kind of way of cheating death if the main parachute failed (as on Soyuz 1) was controversial.
In the design mission profile, the L1 plus Block D had a total mass of 22,900 kg after separating from the third stage of the Proton. The SOZ thruster package on the Block D fired briefly to settle the propellants in the stack, then the RD-58 main engine of the Block D fired for 140 seconds to place the whole assembly into a parking orbit (200 km altitude, 51.6 deg inclination). The forward SOK jettisonable support cone was blown off once the spacecraft was in orbit. When the proper moment was reached in parking orbit, the SOZ fired again to settle the propellants in the tanks. Once the RD-58 ignited, the SOZ thruster and propellant tank package separated and was left behind.
The detail of the standard manoeuvre summary can be reconstructed with good accuracy based on information given in various original documents:
|Maneuver||Starting Mass||Ending Mass||Isp||Burn Time||Delta-V m/s||Comment|
|SOZ DV1||22,900||22,450||250||18||49||Block D Ullage|
|Block D DV1||22,450||19,040||349||140||564||Place into parking orbit|
|SOZ DV2||18,860||18,500||250||15||47||Jettison 180 kg support cone before ignition|
|Block D DV2||18,200||7,510||349||439||3,028||Jettison 300 kg SOZ package after ignition|
|L1 Mass||5,500||Jettison Block D (1800 kg dry plus residual propellants)|
What made the Podsadka variant possible was that the final mass sent toward the moon was relatively insensitive to any additional mass that was carried into low earth orbit, but jettisoned before translunar injection. The trade-offs were:
What was the Podsadka transfer mechanism? The most obvious solution would be a female docking collar fitted to the SOK. The crew would transfer from the Soyuz BO orbital cabin to the hatch in the side of the L1 SA capsule. This solution seems to be represented by the L1 drawing at the Kaluga Museum in Russia.
Another solution, for which Charles Vick feels there is clear evidence, would be to fit an inflatable airlock to the SOK. The Soyuz would rendezvous with the L1, but not dock to it. Two cosmonauts would free-float from the Soyuz to the airlock, and then enter the L1 SA through the conventional hatch at the top of the capsule. Some L1 photographs and drawings released seem to show very odd assemblages of equipment in the SOK, not at all like a docking collar or simple SAS electronics.
In favour of the first solution, is the fact that this scenario was being practised intently by the cosmonauts on the contemporary Soyuz 1-2, 4-5, and 6-7 missions. Why should demonstrating such a docking and EVA be an overriding objective when there was no intention to use it? Furthermore, the same scenario could be used for docking with L1S lunar orbiters launched by N1 (which clearly had no access through the forward hatch since the large lunar orbit manoeuvring engine assembly was blocking it).
One objection raised to this scenario is that the SA cabin would have to be depressurised for cosmonauts to enter directly through a side hatch. Russian avionics and electronics were normally placed in a pressurised container in the 1960's. However there are several items of evidence to contradict this:
Points in favour of the proposed airlock scenario:
A major point contradicting the airlock scenario is that Kamanin, in the tests mentioned above, specifically mentions that the cosmonaut found it virtually impossible to get through the Soyuz forward hatch in a pressurised Yastreb spacesuit.
In any case, it is possible that both solutions were pursued in parallel. Pending any final complete release of information in regard to the Soviet manned lunar programmes, the controversy will remain unresolved.